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ABSTRACT
On September 11, 2001, terrorists attacked America without warning, killing
2752 in New York City alone. The President declared war on terrorism and
pledged to use all resources at United States’ disposal to conquer the enemy.
On October 26, 2001, President Bush signed into law the USA PATRIOT
ACT, giving the law enforcement officials expansive powers and security
agencies increased resources to fight terrorism, at home and abroad.
A cursory review of the legal literature shows that the USA PATRIOT ACT
was “rushed” passed Congress by the Bush administration without following
the usual legislative procedure. Throughout the entire legislative process,
neither the Congress nor the Administration has systematically investigated
and critically debated the merit – necessity and efficacy, costs and benefits,
and the impact and implications of the ACT on the Constitution, on the
society, on the people. More mystifyingly, neither the general public nor the
mass media took the government to task for a want of due diligent in
scrutinizing the ACT. How could this have happened? To date, no serious
attempt has been made to explain how and why the USA PATRIOT ACT
was adopted without any serious context and effective challenge. This is a
first attempt to do so.
This article, based on a larger research project (“The Impact and
Implications of USA PATRIOT Act on American Society.”) investigated
into the legislative history of the USA PATRIOT ACT, broadly define. This
article is first of a two part series reporting upon: “The Making of the USA
PATRIOT ACT”. It is subtitled: “Legislative Process and Dynamics”. The
article to follow is subtitled: “Legislative Climate and Political Context.”
This article examined the Congressional records, tracked the floor debates
and monitored newspaper accounts to document the process and detail the
dynamics as to how the USA PATRIOT ACT was passed. The subsequent
article would be looking into the historical context, political climate, social
circumstances, and cultural milieu to ascertain why the USA PATRIOT
ACT was made in the way and manner it did.
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The making of the USA PATRIOT ACT I:
The Legislative Process and Dynamics
"Those who would give up essential liberty to purchase a little
temporary safety deserves neither liberty nor safety."
Benjamin Franklin
I
Introduction
On September 11, 2001, terrorists attacked America without warning, killing
2752 in New York City alone.2 On September 12, 2001, the President
declared war on terrorism, pledging: “United States of America will use all
our sources to conquer this enemy.”3 On October 26, 2001, President Bush
signed into law the USA PATRIOT ACT,4 giving the law enforcement
officials expansive powers and the security agencies increased resources to
fight terrorism, at home and abroad.5
A cursory review of the legal literature6 shows that the USA PATRIOT Act
was “rushed” passed Congress by the Bush administration without following
2

There are conflicting accounts on the number of death toll to 9/11. The figure cited here
is based on the most recent accounting of confirmed dead. See “2,752: World Trade
Center Death Toll Shrinks By 40,” WNBC.com October 30, 2003. The other account is
2819 deaths, “9/11 by the Numbers” New York Magazine
http://www.newyorkmetro.com/news/articles/wtc/1year/numbers.htm Altogether, the FBI
reported 3,047 victims resulting from the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001: 2,175
males and 648 females died at the World Trade Center; 108 males and 71 females died at
the Pentagon; and 20 males and 20 females died in the plane crash in Somerset County,
PA. Seventy-one law enforcement officers were killed in the line of duty at a result of the
attacks on the World Trade Center. (Federal Bureau of Investigation. 2002. Uniform
Crime Reports: Crime in the United States 2001. (Washington DC: U.S. Department of
Justice.)
3
“Remarks By The President In Photo Opportunity With The National Security Team,”
The Cabinet Room, 10:53 A.M. EDT. The White House, Office of the Press Secretary ,
September 12, 2001. http://usinfo.state.gov/topical/pol/terror/01091208.htm
4
USA PATRIOT Act, October 26, 2001, P. L.107-056; 115 STAT. 272.
5
For legal analysis, see Charles Doyle, “The USA PATRIOT Act: A Legal Analysis,”
Congressional Research Service, April 15, 2002.
6
A recent systematic biographic search by a law librarian uncovered only one entry
having to do the legislative history of USA PATRIOT ACT, i.e. Beryl A. Howell,
“Seven Weeks: The Making of the USA PATRIOT Act,” 72 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 1145
(2004). Howell benefited from being an insider to the legislative process. He worked for
3

the usual legislative procedure, i.e., agency review,7 public hearings,8 mark
up, 9 floor debate,10 and conference report,11 in both chambers.12 More
Senator Leahy, then the Chairman of the Senate Judiciary Committee. See Kate Dixon,
“The U.S.A. PATRIOT Act: A Selected Bibliography,” Research Librarian Western New
England College School of Law Library. April 2005. The author’s independent research
by author showed that there was no authoritative account on the legislative history of
Anti-Terrorism Act of 2001 and USA PATRIOT ACT. The data relied upon for this
research came from the following sources. For a brief, but informative, account of how
the Act was rushed through Congress, see the investigative report of Robert O' Harrow Jr.
(with assistance from the Center for Investigative Reporting) “Six Weeks in Autumn,”
Washington Post. Sunday, October 27, 2002; Page W06 (The Patriot Act was rushed
through Congress by the administration under the stewardship of Ashcroft.) For a day to
day account of anti-terrorism legislative activities in the Congress, see Tech Law Journal
Daily E-Mail Alert http://www.techlawjournal.com/welcome.htm For a detail
description of the passage of the Patriot Act, see James Bovard, Terrorism and Tyranny:
Trampling Freedom, Justice, and Peace to Rid the World of Evil (Palgrave Macmillan,
2003), esp. Chapter 4: “Patriot Railroad.” For a compilation of legislative materials, see
Bernard D., Jr. Reams and Christopher Anglim (Editors), USA Patriot Act: A Legislative
History of the Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools
Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act (Fred B Rothman & Co, 2002). For a
summary of the process, see “Introduction”, Id. For an inside the beltway account of the
legislative process, see “USA PATRIOT Act: A Summary of ALA Activities,” ALA
Washington Office, Jan.19, 2002. For an electronic library of key legislative documents,
consult “Legislative History of the USA PATRIOT Act,” Center for Democracy and
Technology. For critical events in the passage of the USA PATRIOT ACT, see Steven
Brill, “WHAT PRICE FREEDOM? The day the Constitution died,” Capitol Hill Blue
March 3, 2003. http://chblue.com/artman/publish/printer_1865.shtml
7
Morton H. Halperin, “Less Secure, Less Free , “ American Prospect Vol. 12, No. 20,
Nov. 19, 2001. http://www.prospect.org/print/V12/20/halperin-m.html (The
Administration original anti-terrorism measures (CTA – ATA – MTA) was the
handmaiden of the Attorney General (AG) staff, alone. The Office of Budget
Management (OBM) was intentionally by passed to deny and avoid input and comments
from agencies.)
8
There were two hearings being held, one on September 25, 2001 when AG Ashcroft
was invited to answer questions on Administration’s anti-terrorism proposals (MATA –
ATA). The Senate Committee on the Judiciary held a hearing on Tuesday, September
25, 2001, at 10:00 a.m. on "Homeland Defense." Presided by Chairman Leahy. The other
was called by Senator Feingold who called a public hearing on October 3, 2001 to discuss
the civil liberties implications of the PATRIOT ACT and related anti-terrorism measures.
The Senate Judiciary Committee's Subcommittee on the Constitution, Federalism, and
Property Rights held a hearing titled "Protecting Constitutional Freedoms in the Face of
Terrorism." Presided by Sen. Russ Feingold (D-WI)
9
Morton H. Halperin, “The Liberties We Defend,” American Prospect Vol. 12, No. 18
Oct. 22, 2001. http://www.prospect.org/print/V12/18/halperin-m-2.html (“Four key
Republicans on the House Judiciary Committee wrote to their chairman questioning the
4

significantly, throughout the entire USA PATRIOT Act legislative process,
neither the Congress nor the Administration has systematically investigated,
judiciously examined, openly debated, and comprehensively considered the
relative merits and utilities – necessity and efficacy, costs and benefits – and
the impact and implication – long and short, direct and indirect - of the
ACT on the Constitution,13 on the society, on the people. In fact, it is fair to
rush to mark up a bill (MATA) after only one hearing with the attorney general (9/25/01).
"What we must avoid," they declared, "is the impulse to hastily approve wholesale
changes to search and seizure, surveillance, immigration and other laws in an
understandable but misguided attempt to thwart future attacks.")
10
Floor debate was limited to 4 hours for USA ACT. Congressional Record: October 11,
2001 (Senate) Page S10547-S10630 The debate was less a debate as it was an
opportunity to put things on the record, i.e. to detail the content and describe the process
(Senator Leahy started by observing that the Bill was not to anyone’s liking); list the
concessions and catalogue the (negotiated) achievements (Senate Leady spent most of the
time allotted explaining various provisions); leave a legislative record anticipating
Supreme Court challenges ahead (Senate Specter (R-PA). See also Beryl A. Howell,
“Seven Weeks: The Making of the USA PATRIOT Act,” 72 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 1145
(2004). (From the beginning to the end, the anti-terrorism legislation was orchestrated for
passage by the Administration, not open for debate by the public or subject to scrutiny of
the Congress. In the final USA ACT debate, the Senate leadership from both parties
made it known that that the USA ACT was not to be changed. No floor amendments
were allowed, save for three by Senator Feingold. Dissenters were shunned, lest they
undo the hard fought and long struggled compromise.)
11
Beryl A. Howell, “Seven Weeks: The Making of the USA PATRIOT Act,” 72 Geo.
Wash. L. Rev. 1145 (2004). (House and Senate Conference on PATRIOT ACT and USA
ACT was done away with because the Bush Administration in general and AG Ashcroft
in particular was afraid that the conference leadership (as then constituted) might
jeopardize the chance of passage.).
12
For process in the Senate, see “Guide to Senate Legislative Processes” (Congressional
Research Service, Feb. 2002). For process in the House, see HOW OUR LAWS ARE
MADE, Revised and Updated by Charles W. Johnson, Parliamentarian, United States
House of Representatives (Last update: Thu, 06 Jan 2005 18:49:22 GMT).
13
There were some concerned expressed by some vocal member of the House and
Senate, e.g. Leahy Feingold, and a coalition of interested parties, e.g. ACLU and EFF,
over he dire consequences of the ACT on civil liberties. But these voices were
intentionally suppressed and conveniently ignored. As a result there was no serious
debate over the long term impact and implications of the ACT on the Constitutional, e.g.
how our democratic institutions and rule of law culture might changed in the wage of
9/11, domestically and internationally. As it turned out from hindsight, 9/11 was a
watershed event. The war on terror has changed international opinion about US
democratic institutions and domestic attitude towards law and order. For intentional
opinion, see “Global Opinion: The Spread of Anti-Americanism A review of Pew Global
Attitudes Project findings,” January 24, 2005 (Increasingly the world – friends and foes
5

say, as other knowledgeable insiders have observed, that the USA PATRIOT
ACT was entirely a Bush administration brainchild, conceived by the AG,
imposed on the Congress14 and fed to the American people in a time of
crisis15 and with the use of high handed tactics.16 How could that have
happened? This is the research question this article seeks to address. To
date, no serious attempt has been made to understand how and why the USA
PATRIOT ACT was able to rush through Congress without serious contest
and effective challenge.17 This is a first attempt to do so.
alike – from Europe to Asia, from South America to Africa - has a negative image of
America, e.g. in terms of favorable ratings, Britain went from 75% (summer 2002) to
58% (Mar. 2004) and Jordon went from 25% to 5% in the same period. The sincerity of
US war on terrorism was widely questioned in 2004: Britain (41%), France (61%),
Russia (48%), Germany (65%), Turkey (64%), Morocco (66%), Jordon (58%) and
Pakistan (58%). Most significantly, world public opinion about US’s commitment to
democracy has slipped in 2004 survey: Britain (45% less committed), France (79%),
Russia (53%), Germany (70%), Turkey (73%), Morocco (66%), Jordon (56%) and
Pakistan (57%). For domestic opinion "Americans on Terrorism: Two Years After 9/11,"
Program on International Policy Attitudes and Knowledge Networks (2003) (By a margin
of 52% vs. 38%, US public surveyed observed that remove of (Constitutional) limitations
on government has gone too far.(p.9) Contrary to government policy. A major believed
that US citizens detained as terrorists should be given rights (80%) and afforded lawyers
(78%).
14
Morton H. Halperin, "Less Secure, Less Free," The American Prospect vol. 12 no. 20,
November 19, 2001 (Even the AG did not read the ATA.) and Beryl A. Howell, “Seven
Weeks: The Making of the USA PATRIOT Act,” 72 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 1145 (2004).
15
The Bush Administration has rejected this charge, emphatically. Viet Dinh “A White
Paper: How Does the USA Patriot Act defends democracy.” The Foundation for the
Defense of Democracies, June 1, 2004. (During the drafting of the anti-terrorism
measures, the Administration has listened to and took heed from a coalition of concerned
voices. (p. 3) http://www.defenddemocracy.org/usr_doc/USA_Patriot_Act.pdf
16
Beryl A. Howell, “Seven Weeks: The Making of the USA PATRIOT Act,” 72 Geo.
Wash. L. Rev. 1145 (2004). (AG Ashcroft repeatedly demanded passage of
Administration proposals with no debate and revisions, with the threat of political fallout
of yet another terrorism as the political weapon of choice.) See Author, “The Making of
USA PATRIOT ACT: “Legislative Climate and Political Forces.” (On file with author).
17
The two exceptions being Beryl A. Howell, “Seven Weeks: The Making of the USA
PATRIOT Act,” 72 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 1145 (2004). (Howell benefited from being an
insider to the legislative process. He worked for Senator Leahy, then the Chairman of
Senate Judiciary Committee) and Robert O' Harrow Jr. (with assistance from the Center
for Investigative Reporting) “Six Weeks in Autumn,” Washington Post. Sunday, October
27, 2002; Page W06 (The USA PATRIOT ACT was rushed through Congress by the
administration under the stewardship of AG staff.) There was suggestion that the
President was personally involved by giving the matching order, i.e. AG Ashcroft acted
only as a loyal foot soldier.)
6

This article, based on a larger research project,18 investigated into the
legislative history of the USA PATRIOT ACT, broadly define. This article
is a first of two part series reporting upon: “The Making of the USA
PATRIOT ACT”. It is subtitled: “Legislative Process and Dynamics”. The
article to follow is subtitled: “Legislative Climate and Political Context.”19
This article examined the Congressional records, tracked the floor debates
and examined newspaper records to understand the process and document
the dynamics as to how the USA PATRIOT ACT was passed. The
subsequent article would be looking into the historical context, political
climate, social circumstances, and cultural milieu to ascertain why the USA
PATRIOT ACT was made in the way and manner it did.
This article is organized into the following parts. After this “Introduction,” Part II: “The
Legislative Process” traced the origin and followed the development of the USA
PATRIOT ACT. It observed that the ACT was rushed through the Congress with few
consultations with the public, collectively, and virtually no participation by the
legislators, individually. Part III: “A failure of process” investigated into how the
legislative process had failed? It further observed that such a failure of process set the
stage for and resulted in post legislative challenges to the USA PATRIOT ACT. Part IV:
“A Preliminary Assessment” descried and discussed some of concerns raised and issued
posed about the USA PATRIOT ACT. Part V: “Concluding observations” summarized
the article’s major findings as it discussed some of the reasons why the legislative process
was compromised, a subject matter to be dealt with at length and in more detail in the
second part to: “The Making of USA PATRIOT ACT.”

18

The article is the result of a three years research project (2002 – 2005) entitled “The
Impact and Implications of USA PATRIOT Act on American Society.” Research output
to-date include: “The Impact and Implications of USA PATRIOT Act: A Preliminary
Analysis” (Midwest Criminal Justice Association Annual Conference, October 2-4,
2004); “USA PATRIOT Act: Just the Facts” (“Patriot Act Forum,” League of Women
Voters, Oshkosh, WI, Nov. 18, 2003); “The Impact and Implications of USA PATRIOT
Act on American libraries” (Asian Association of Police Studies IV Annual Conference,
Dec. 15-18, 2003) and “The Impact and Implications of USA PATRIOT Act on
American Higher Education” (Academy of Criminal Justice Sciences Annual
Conference, March 9-13, 2004). “The USA PATRIOT ACT: Some Unanswered
Questions,” Wisconsin Political Scientist Vol. IX (3), Fall 2003, pp. 6-9; “USA
PATRIOT ACT: More Questions than Answers” (2005) and “Implementing the USA
PATRIOT ACT: A Case Study of the Student and Exchange Visitor Information System
(SEVIS)” (2005), both currently under publication review.
19
Author, “The making of the USA PATRIOT ACT II: “Legislative Climate and
Political Context.” (October 1, 2005). Under review. On file with author.
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II
The Legislative Process
Combating Terrorism Act of 2001 - AMENDMENT NO. 156220
The first comprehensive and significant post 9/11 anti-terrorism
measure21 introduced was in the form of an amendment attached to a budget
appropriation bill “DEPARTMENTS OF COMMERCE, JUSTICE, AND
STATE, THE JUDICIARY, AND RELATED AGENCIES
APPROPRIATIONS ACT, 2002” (HR 2500) in the Senate on September

20

Combating Terrorism Act of 2001, S. Amdt. 1562, 107th Cong. (2001),
http://www.cdt.org/security/010913senatewiretap2.shtml. (last visited November 16,
2003).
21
For a list of 9/11 legislations, see “LEGISLATION RELATED TO THE ATTACK OF
SEPTEMBER 11, 2001,” http://thomas.loc.gov/home/terrorleg.htm The Acts and Bills
introduced during the two week of 9/11 included: Victims of Terrorism Tax Relief Act of
2001, Public Law No: 107-134 (introduced 9/13/2001) (“Exempts from income taxes any
individual who dies as a result of wounds or injury incurred from the terrorist attacks
against the United States on April 19, 1995, or September 11, 2001, or who dies as a
result of illness incurred from a terrorist attack involving anthrax occurring on or after
September 11, 2001, and before January 1, 2002 (such attacks).”); Public Safety Officer
Benefits Bill, Public Law No: 107-37 (introduced 9/13/2001) (“To provide for the
expedited payment of certain benefits for a public safety officer who was killed or
suffered a catastrophic injury as a direct and proximate result of a personal injury
sustained in the line of duty in connection with the terrorist attacks of September 11,
2001.”); Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2002 (“To authorize
appropriations for fiscal year 2002 for intelligence and intelligence-related activities of
the United States Government, the Community Management Account, and the Central
Intelligence Agency Retirement and Disability System, and for other purposes.”); 2001
Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act for Recovery from and Response to
Terrorist Attacks on the United States, Public Law No: 107-38 (introduced 9/14/2001)
(“Making emergency supplemental appropriations for the fiscal year 2001 for additional
disaster assistance, for anti-terrorism initiatives, and for assistance in the recovery from
the tragedy that occurred on September 11, 2001, and for other purposes.”); Air
Transportation Safety and System Stabilization Act, Public Law No: 107-42 (introduced
on 9/21/2001) (“To preserve the continued viability of the United States air transportation
system.”); Freedom Bonds Act of 2001, H.R.2899 (introduced 9/17/2001) (“To authorize
the Secretary of the Treasury to issue Freedom Bonds in response to the September 11,
2001, hijackings and attacks on the Pentagon and the World Trade Center, and for other
purposes.”). For a summary of existing terrorism federal law provisions as of October
2001, see “Terrorism Legislation Comparison,”
http://www.netcaucus.org/books/surveillance2001/docs/EFF_Leg_Compare_Chart.pdf
8

13, 2001,22 i.e. AMENDMENT NO. 1562, entitled: “Combating Terrorism
Act of 2001." (CTA) 23
The professed purpose CTA was: “To enhance the capability of the United
States to deter, prevent, and thwart domestic and international acts of
terrorism against United States nationals and interests.”24 In more layman’s
term and as Senator Hatch put it: “It is essential that we give our law
enforcement authorities every possible tool to search out and bring to justice
those individuals who have brought such indiscriminate death into our
backyard.”25
The CTA was cosponsored by Senators Hatch (R-Utah), Feinstein (D-CA),
and Kyl (R-Arizona). Senators Dewine, Session, Thompson, Thurmond,
McCain, and Schumer also joined.26 The CTA passed the Senate two days
after 9/11, with about 30 minutes of floor debate and one lone dissenting
voice, i.e. that of Sen. Patrick Leahy (D-VT). Leahy wanted more time to
study the bill.27 This was an all too familiar pattern with post 9/11 legislative
measures,28 to be repeated with the USA PATRIOT ACT.29
22

See Congressional Record, September 13, 2001, at pages S9401-4.
For a discussion, see “Liberty for Security,” Duke L. & Tech. Rev. 0036 (2001), esp.
“Combating Terrorism Act of 2001.” For a copy of the CTA text, see
http://msbnetworks.net/~hillct/cta/ For Senate floor debate, see “Senate debate on wiretap
and anti-terrorism proposals,” Sept. 13, 2001 (Hereinafter “Combating Terrorism Act of
2001 debate”) http://www.cdt.org/security/010913senatewiretap.shtml
24
See Combating Terrorism Act of 2001 debate.
25
Declan McCullagh, “Senate OKs FBI Net Spying,” WIRED NEWS 12:55 PM Sep. 14,
2001 PT http://www.wired.com/news/politics/0,1283,46852,00.html
26
Senator Kyl, Hatch, and Feinstein were all members of the Subcommittee on
Technology, Terrorism, and Government Information and Terrorism, (106th Congress),
and later the Technology and Homeland Security (107th and 108th Congress) which was
responsible for “Oversight of anti-terrorism enforcement and policy”. Senator Feinstein
was the Chairman of Subcommittee on Technology, Terrorism, and Government
Information (106th Congress) in 2001 with Senator Kye acting as the Ranking
Republican. Senator Kyl was the Chairman and Senator Feinstein was the Ranking
Democrat on the Terrorism, Technology and Homeland Security (107th and 108th
Congress).
27
See Senate Leahy floor speech, Combating Terrorism Act of 2001 debate.
28
See Author, “The USA PATRIOT Act: Some Unanswered Questions” (September 1,
2005) (Under review, on file with author), esp. “Table 2: The number of 9/11 legislative
actions acted upon within six (6) months,” referencing Margaret F. Klemm & Albert C.
Ringelstein, “Congressional Response to the September 11, 2001 Terrorist Attacks,”
extensions. A Journal of Carl Albert Center (Fall 2002).
23
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The CTA was intended to provide law enforcement officials with the
necessary resources and added legal authority to fight terrorism, particularly
in the investigation of 9/11 terrorists and to bring them to justice. As
observed by Senator Hatch in introducing the CTA: “we, as lawmakers,
must take every step possible to ensure, in addition to adequate financial
resources, that the law enforcement community has the proper investigative
tools at its disposal to track down the participants in this evil conspiracy and
to bring them to justice.” 30
Facing with a national crisis of yet untold proportion, the Congressional
leadership had contingency plans to secure the nation, in the event CTA
failed to materialize, there were to be back up plans. For example, on
September 20, 2001, Rep. Lamar Smith circulated a bill - Public Safety and
Cyber Security Enhancement Act (PSCSEA) – similar to the CTA as a
backup for S.A. 1562 should H.R. 2500 failed to pass. Sen. Patrick Leahy
was also working on his own anti-terrorism bill, later passed as the USA
ACT.
The CTA was demanded by the public (to secure the nation)31 and required
by the situation (in fighting an illusive enemy). 32 Above all else it reflected
and reinforced the nation’s sober mood and crisis mentality. The political
climate of the time was in seeking security at all costs.33 Most of the
provisions have been recommended by former anti-terrorism commissions,
e.g. National Commission on Terrorism34 and requested by law enforcement

29

Id.
See Combating Terrorism Act of 2001 debate.
31
Senator Kye: “But, as policymakers, we have also been asked some hard questions by
our constituents and those questions include things such as: Why can't our Government
do something about these horrible crimes?” Id.
32
“On the Importance of Anti-terrorism Legislation,” (“Viet Dinh: I think the American
people have made their preferences very clear in their public statements expressed to the
various news agencies, not only with respect to the fight against terrorism, but on this
package in particular.”) http://www.aclj.org/news/nf_011004_viet_dinh_interview.asp
33
Author, “The making of the USA PATRIOT ACT II: The Legislative Climate and
Political Context,” (October 1, 2005). Under review. On file with author.
33
Combating Terrorism Act of 2001, S. Amdt. 1562, 107th Cong. (2001).
34
See testimony of Senator Kyle, Combating Terrorism Act of 2001 debate. (“We
implement one of the recommendations of the Bremer commission, which said there is a
lot of illicit fundraising for terrorist organizations going on in the United States. “)
30

10

officials for years. As Senator Kye observed when speaking in support of the
bill: “In addition to that, we have had a lot of testimony from the Director of
the FBI and other U.S. Government officials all imploring us to do some
things to help in this battle against terrorism.” 35 Nearly half of the
provisions have passed the Senate one and half year before.36
The “Combating Terrorism Act of 2001'' provided for improvement on:
(a) Readiness and readiness The Comptroller General was asked to report
upon the capacity and readiness of National Guard in the event of a terrorist
attack. Particularly, “an assessment of the capabilities of the National Guard
to preemptively disrupt a terrorist attack within the United States involving
weapons of mass destruction, and to respond to such an attack” (Section 812
(a).37
(b) Scientific and technology research The President was asked to establish a
long-term and comprehensive scientific and technology research program to
prevent, preempt, detect, interdict, and respond to catastrophic terrorist
attacks (Section 813). 38
(c) Legal authority The Attorney General was asked to conduct a review of
the legal authority of the Federal government agencies to adequately respond
to - prevent, preempt, detect, and interdict – “catastrophic terrorist attacks.”
(Section 814)39
(d) Intelligence recruitment The Director of Central Intelligence was asked
to rescind the 1995 CIA guidelines relating to “the recruitment of persons

Bremer and Sonnenberg, “Countering the Changing Threat on International Terrorism,”
National Commission on Terrorism. http://www.fas.org/irp/threat/commission.html
35
Id.
36
See testimony of Senator Kyle, Combating Terrorism Act of 2001 debate. (“In fact, we
incorporated some of the provisions of these commission recommendations in the bill
that passed the Senate a year and a half ago.”)
37
SEC. 812. ASSESSMENT OF NATIONAL GUARD CAPABILITIES TO
PREEMPTIVE.
38
SEC. 813. LONG-TERM RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT TO ADDRESS
CATASTROPHIC TERRORIST ATTACKS.
39
SEC. 814. REVIEW OF AUTHORITY OF FEDERAL AGENCIES TO ADDRESS
CATASTROPHIC TERRORIST ATTACKS.
11

who have access to intelligence related terrorist plans, intentions and
capabilities.” (Section 815)40
(e) Wiretapping The President was asked to report on “legal authorities that
govern the sharing of criminal wiretap information under applicable Federal
laws, including section 104 of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C.
403-4). (Section 816 (a).41
(f) Terrorism financing The Federal Government was asked to use all the
tools available to prevent, deter, or disrupt the fundraising activities of
international terrorist organizations, and it should do so. (Section 817 (b)42
(g) Controls of biological pathogens The Attorney General was asked to
report upon on “the means of improving United States controls of biological
pathogens and the equipment necessary to develop, produce, or deliver
biological weapons” (Section 818 (a).43 Specifically, The Attorney General
was asked to report upon measures to protect possession, handling, storing,
or transporting of such pathogens from illegal theft or other wrongful
diversion (Section 818 (b).
(i) Employee liability insurance The Head of Federal agencies were to
reimburse law enforcement agents and intelligence employees for
professional liability insurance when conducting counterterrorism duties
(Section 819 (a)44
(j) Use a pen register or trap and trace device Federal and State investigative
or law enforcement officers are authorized to use a pen register or trap and
trace device to obtain “dialing, routing, addressing” information by
certifying “to the court that the information likely to be obtained by such
installation and use is relevant to an ongoing criminal investigation.”

40

SEC. 815. GUIDELINES ON RECRUITMENT OF TERRORIST INFORMANTS
SEC. 816. DISCLOSURE BY LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES OF CERTAIN
INTELLIGENCE OBTAINED BY INTERCEPTION OF COMMUNICATIONS.
42
SEC. 817. JOINT TASK FORCE ON TERRORIST FUNDR
43
SEC. 818. IMPROVEMENT OF CONTROLS ON PATHOGENS AND EQUIPMENT
FOR PRODUCTION OF BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS
44
SEC. 819. REIMBURSEMENT OF PERSONNEL PERFORMING
COUNTERTERRORISM DUTIES FOR PROFESSIONAL LIABILITY INSURANCE
41

12

(Section.832 (b).45 It also authorized the emergency installation of such
devices by U.S. Attorneys if there is immediate threat to “national security”,
public health or safety”, “attack on the integrity or availability of a protected
computer (Section.832 (c)
(k) Intercept wire, oral and electronic communications Law enforcement
officials can intercept wire, oral and electronic communications in the
investigation of terrorism (Section 833)46 and computer fraud and abuse
(Section 834) offenses.47
As it turned out, the process and debate over AMENDMENT NO. 1562
served as a dry run for the USA PATRIOT ACT; acting as harbinger of
things to come. Specifically, it anticipated many of the substantive issues
raised, e.g. roving wiretap as threatening civil liberties, and rehearsed most
of process related arguments made, e.g. Congress should not rush to
judgment without proper notice and public hearing. For example, much like
the USA PATRIOT Act the CTA was supplied to the Senators only 30
minutes before the floor debate.48 In this regard, Senator Leahy CTA floor
speech was instructive on things to come:
“Unfortunately, because this is something that we have had no
hearings on, we haven't had the discussions in the appropriate
committees--Intelligence, Armed Services, and Judiciary--we
are somewhat limited in opposition… I would feel far more
comfortable voting on something like this if these various
committees not only had a chance to look at it but that President
Bush's administration--the Attorney General, the Director of
CIA, the Secretary of Defense--would have the opportunity to
let us know their views on it. I would feel far more comfortable
with that.”49

45

SEC. 832. MODIFICATION OF AUTHORITIES RELATING TO USE OF PEN
REGISTERS AND TRAP AND TRACE DEVICES.
46
SEC. 833. AUTHORITY TO INTERCEPT WIRE, ORAL, AND ELECTRONIC
COMMUNICATIONS RELATING TO TERRORISM OFFENSES.
47
SEC. 834. AUTHORITY TO INTERCEPT WIRE, ORAL, AND ELECTRONIC
COMMUNICATIONS RELATING TO COMPUTER FRAUD AND ABUSE.
48
Morgan Streetman, “Liberty for Security,” 2001 The Duke Law & Technology Review
(DLTR) 0036, para. 8 http://www.law.duke.edu/journals/dltr/articles/2001dltr0036.html
49
See Combating Terrorism Act of 2001 debate.
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The CTA did not attract much immediate media report or public attention.50
The nation was still taken back over the aftermath and dealing with the
consequences of the 9/11 attack.
There were however serious concerns and vocal complaints over the
vagueness of many of its provisions, e.g. the exact meaning of “addressing”
and “routing” data accessible by pen register and track and trace order,51 and
their erosive impact on liberties, e.g. how intrusive is electronic surveillance
on web based activities,52 form some quarters, mainly from long established
interest (human rights) groups, such as ACLU, and (civil rights) advocacy

50

There were occasional constituent letters to the law-makers. There was not systematic
counting or analysis of such letters. See letter of Mike Perry (505 E. White St #4,
Champaign, Il, 61820)to Dear Senators Durbin and Fitzgerald, and Representative
Johnson (A-G Ashcroft's Anti-Terrorism Act (ATA); Sen. Leahy's Uniting and
Strengthening of America Act (USAA); Rep. Smith's Public Safety and Cyber Security
Enhancement Act (PSCSEA, H.R. 2915); Sen. Hatch's Combating Terrorism Act (CTA,
amendment S.A. 1562 to bill H.R. 2500); and Sen. Graham's Intelligence to Prevent
Terrorism Act (IPTA, S. 1448), and Sen. Gregg's draft anti-encryption legislation were
ill advised. Instead of catching hard core terrorists, they would affect innocent citizens.
For example by declaring computer crime terrorism acts, it end up serving extensive
punishments for “young, curious programmers, essentially pranksters” who one day
might “grow up to be accomplished security professionals.”)
http://fscked.org/rants/letters/Repletter
51
“Senate OKs FBI Net Spying,” Wired, September 11, 2001 ("Nobody really knows
what routing and addressing information is.... If you're putting in addressing information
and routing information, you may not just get (From: lines of e-mail messages), you
might also get content," the source said. )
http://www.wired.com/news/politics/0,1283,46852,00.html
52
See open web e-mail to Senator Feinstein “14-09-2001: Combating Terrorism Act of
2001,” http://www.kocharhook.com/nick/letters/cta2001.html
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coalitions, such as Electronic Frontier Foundation.53 For example, the
Electronic Frontier Foundation was critical of various aspects of CTA: 54
(1) CTA expands “traditional” wiretap authority beyond recognition. Before
CTA, wiretap orders were authorized based on a short list of well defined
predicated offences. Now, the CTA allows for wiretapping based on loosely
copulated terrorism crime (Section 833)55 and computer fraud and abuse
(Section 834).56
(2) CTA allows for application of “pen register” and “track and trace” to
electronic communication, e.g. e-mail, web surf, URL search. This opens up
the possibility of tracking content.
The CTA expands the pen register concept from merely capturing phone
numbers57 to capturing routing and addressing information in any electronic
communications, e.g. Internet communications. Thus the definition of pen
register under the amended (18 U.S.C. § 3127(3) now reads: "a device or
process which records or decodes dialing, routing, addressing, or signaling
information transmitted by an instrument or facility from which a wire or
electronic communication is transmitted ..." Similarly, 18 U.S.C. § 3127(4)
defines ''trap and trace device'' means a device or process which captures the
53

The Electronic Frontier helps keep track of impact of anti-terrorism measures (not all
of them related to terrorism law or USA PATRIOT ACT) from day one: “Chilling
Effects of Anti-Terrorism "National Security" Toll on Freedom of Expression, including:
Websites Shut Down by US Government; Websites Shut Down by Other Governments;
Websites Shut Down by Internet Service Provider; Websites Shut Down or Partially
Removed by Website Owner; US Government Websites That Shut Down or Removed
Information; US Government Requests to Remove Information
Media Professionals Terminated or Suspended; Other Employees Terminated or
Suspended; Related Incidents.
http://www.eff.org/Censorship/Terrorism_militias/antiterrorism_chill.php#websiteshutdo
wnusgov
54
EFF Analysis of SA 1562, Subtitle B (Sept. 19, 2001), http://www.eff.org/ (last visited
October 2, 2001).
55
SEC. 833. AUTHORITY TO INTERCEPT WIRE, ORAL, AND ELECTRONIC
COMMUNICATIONS RELATING TO TERRORISM OFFENSES.
56
SEC. 834. AUTHORITY TO INTERCEPT WIRE, ORAL, AND ELECTRONIC
COMMUNICATIONS RELATING TO COMPUTER FRAUD AND ABUSE.
57
Under the former law “pen register” and “track and trace” devices only applied to
"wire" communications. Thus, a “pen register” is "a device which records or decodes
electronic or other impulses which identify the numbers dialed or otherwise transmitted
on the telephone line to which such device is attached ..."
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incoming electronic or other impulses which identify the originating number
or other dialing, routing, addressing, and signaling information reasonably
likely to identify the source of a wire or electronic communication, provided,
however, that such information shall not include the contents of any
communication..”
(3) CTA allows for multi-jurisdiction “pen register” and “trap and trace”
orders. Whereas before CTA pen register and trap and trace orders only
apply "within the jurisdiction of the court." The CTA allows for one stop
“pen register” and “trap and trace” orders that are applicable nation wide,
without the legal jurisdiction and beyond the effective supervision of the
authoring judge: "The order shall, upon service of the order, apply to any
entity providing wire or electronic communication service in the United
States whose assistance is required to effectuate the order." (Section 832 (b)
(1).
(4) CTA lowers the threshold of approval (i.e. relevant to ongoing criminal
investigation) and minimizes judicial supervision (i.e. court order based on
certification of law enforcement officials) in the application for “pen
register” and “trap and trace” orders in electronic surveillance cases. In so
doing, CTA extends the old wiretap order application standard and
procedures to electronic searches.58 Section 832 (b) (1) reads in pertinent
part: “Upon an application made under section 3122(a)(1) of this title, the
court shall enter an ex parte order authorizing the installation and use of a
pen register or trap and trace device if the court finds that the attorney for the
Government has certified to the court that the information likely to be
obtained by such installation and use is relevant to an ongoing criminal
investigation.” (Emphasis supplied)
There were also concerns with the legislative process:
“Perhaps extending the privileges of government to limit our
privacy is something that should be done in half an hour in the
middle of the night, as it was here, but then again, maybe
58

18 U.S.C. 3223 provides in pertinent parts "the court shall enter an ex parte order
authorizing the installation and use of a pen register or a trap and trace device within the
jurisdiction of the court if the court finds that the attorney for the Government or the State
law enforcement or investigative officer has certified to the court that the information
likely to be obtained by such installation and use is relevant to an ongoing criminal
investigation."
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Senators Carl Levin of Michigan and Patrick Leahy of Vermont
were correct, that this was all being done far too quickly, with a
speed in fact that prevented most of the senators to make a full
review of the legislation which was presented to them a mere
half hour before they were to vote on it.”59
Some felt that the CTA were more show than substance,60 symbolic than
real.61
The Bush administration in general, and AG Ashcroft in particular, has been
consistently blamed and universally condemned by many in the United
States for using 9/11 to push for draconian measures, transforming United
States into an Owellian state with the passage of CTA – MATA - ATA –
Patriot Act.62 As lamented by Al Gore: "They have taken us much farther
down the road toward an intrusive, 'big brother'-style government - toward
the dangers prophesied by George Orwell in his book '1984' - than anyone
ever thought would be possible in the United States of America."63
While it certainly is true that Ashcroft was responsible with originating and
implementing many of the post 9/11 terrorism counter-measures, he did not
drafted all of them out of clean cloth. A fair reading of historical records
suggests that many of the counter-measures already existed on the book and

59

“Combating Terrorism Act of 2001 - Analyzed (Op-Ed),”Tue Sep 18th, 2001 at
12:24:17 PM EST http://www.kuro5hin.org/story/2001/9/17/22230/2697
60
Bon Barr the maverick Republican Representative openly questioned the necessity and
utility of the CTA. “Fighting Terrorism, Preserving Civil Liberties,” CATO, POLICY
FORUM, Tuesday, October 2, 200. 4:00 p.m. (Featuring Rep. Bob Barr (R - Ga.), with
commentary by Solveig Singleton, Senior Analyst, Competitive Enterprise Institute;
Stuart Taylor, Senior Writer, National Journal; Jonathan Turley, Professor of Law,
George Washington University.)
61
“SECRECY NEWS: from the FAS Project on Government Secrecy,”
September 14, 2001 (Most of legislation consisted of declaration of sense of Congress
and requests for reports, rather than providing for new powers to fight terrorism. The
exception being doing away with 1995 CIA guidelines governing the recruitment of
informants who have committed human rights violations.)
http://www.fas.org/sgp/news/secrecy/2001/09/091401.html
62
“Gore: Bush Has Failed to Make U.S. Safer,” Earthlink, November 10, 2003.
63
Id.
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otherwise they were introduced by the Congress, as with making “pen
register” and “track and trace” applicable electronically and nationally.64
The MATA & ATA
The conceptualization of what eventually comes to be known as the
USA PATRIOT ACT started with a simple instruction from President Bush
65
to the Attorney General (AG) Ashcroft immediately after the 9/11 attack:
“John, make sure this (9/11 – terrorism) can’t happen again.”66 The AG
took the charge seriously, and zealously, and above all else personally.67 68
64

See “An Analysis of How the Events of September 11 May Change Federal Law,”
Tech Law Journal, September 17, 2001
65
To date, there is no investigation into the role of President Bush in the drafting and
passage of the USA PATRIOT ACT and related anti-terrorist, measures. Was President
Bush a hands-off manager, aloof and detached, as many observers made him out to be?
To what extent and in what manner did Bush contributed – in content and process - to
the passage of the USA PATRIOT ACT? 9/11 was a defining moment to the Bush
administration. How Bush handled 9/11, from talking to the crowd at ground zero to
pushing the USA PATRIOT ACT through Congress, unmistakably reflected Bush
governance philosophy and management style. These are some of the traits attributed to
Bush: ideological, elitists, not curious, not intellectual, focused, single minded, stubborn.
commanding not consulting. not given to compromise, contempt for Congress,
dismissive of the media.
66
The instruction was given in the White House in the afternoon of 9/11. Steven Brill,
After: How American Confronted the September 12 Era (N.Y.: Simon & Shuster, 2003),
p. 15.
67
Attorney General Ashcroft Announces the Formation of Anti-terrorism Task Forces in
U.S. Attorney Offices, DOJ, Press release, September 18, 2001; Letter to Mayors from
Attorney General Ashcroft (9/19/01) (on formation of anti-terrorism task force)
(September 19, 2001); ATTORNEY GENERAL ASHCROFT DIRECTS LAW
ENFORCEMENT OFFICIALS TO IMPLEMENT NEW ANTI-TERRORISM ACT,
DOJ, Press release, FRIDAY, OCTOBER 26, 2001; Dan Eggen, “Ashcroft champions
Patriot Act Responding to critics, attorney general says law is linchpin of war on
terrorism,” San Francisco Chronicle, Wednesday, August 20, 2003 (The AG took
personally charge of a national campaign (18 cities) to drum up support form the USA
PATRIOT ACT). For an assessment of Ashcroft’s tenure as AG and his impact on war
on terrorism, see “CONTROVERSIAL TENURE” PBS- Online News-hour November
11, 2004. http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/law/july-dec04/ashcroft_11-11.html
68
In public service, officials are supposed to separate private preferences from public
goods. Public policy choices are determined by how such choices reflect public values
and promote public interests, not personal ones. In the case of Ashcroft, he not only
failed to draw the distinction but actively make his own ideology, value and interests
stands for the good of the nation; from religious believes, to moral values to political
ideology. JUDY BACHRACH, “John Ashcroft's Patriot Games,” Vanity Fair Feb. 1,
2004. http://www.mindfully.org/Reform/2004/Ashcroft-Patriot-Games1feb04.htm
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The AG turned to Viet Dinh,69 an Assistant Attorney General in charge of
Department of Justice,70 Office of Legal Policy, to work on an anti-terrorism
package on the same day.71 On Thursday (September 13, 2001) Dinh told
Ashcroft that the package – Mobilization Anti-Terrorism Act (MATA)72 (“"There are only two things you find in the middle of the road, a moderate and a dead
skunk" He believes that "you can legislate morality," and that any senator who suggests
otherwise will simply be legislating "immorality, and we've done too much of that
already." The attorney general invested his fight for the Patriot Act with a Crusader's
fervor, "questioning his opponents' patriotism…")
69
Viet Dinh was know as the “chief architect of the USA Patriot Act. "At Home in War
on Terror: Viet Dinh has gone from academe to play a key behind-the scenes role.
Conservatives love him; others find his views constitutionally suspect." Los Angeles
Times September 18, 2002. http://www.asianam.org/viet%20dinh.htm In time, he
becomes the ACTS chief spokesman and defender. His rational for the USA PATRIOT
ACT is always couched in terms of security before freedom; one cannot enjoy the later
without the guarantee of the former. Viet Dinh “A White Paper: How Does the USA
Patriot Act defends democracy.” The Foundation for the Defense of Democracies, June
1, 2004.
70
OPIC: USA Patriot Act; INTERVIEW SUBJECT: Viet Dinh; FILM: THE COST OF
FREEDOM - Civil Liberties, Security and the USA PATRIOT Act; INTERVIEWER:
Alison Rostankowski/Chip Duncan; TRANSCRIPTS: Troy Avdek. © 2004 The Duncan
Group, Inc. http://www.duncanentertainment.com/interview_vietdinh.php (Viet Dinh
Interview)
71
Another account suggested that Dinh’s marching order came on September 12, 2001
(Wednesday) indirectly by way of Adam Ciongoli, Ashcroft's counselor. Robert
O'Harrow Jr., “Six Weeks in Autumn,” Washington Post Sunday, October 27, 2002; Page
W06.
72
The original draft of the anti-terrorism package worked on by Dinh and released to the
Congress on September 19, 2001 was a 31 page document entitled MATA. For the
proposed text of the first draft of MATA, see
http://www.eff.org/Privacy/Surveillance/20010919_mata_bill_draft.html For a fair and
balance analysis of original draft to MATA, see DOJ
http://www.eff.org/Privacy/Surveillance/20010919_doj_mata_analysis.html
The second draft of the MATA, a 21 pages bill, rendered on September 19, 2001l – 12.30
pm, is entitled ATA of 2001. For text of second draft of MATA a/k/a ATA, see
http://www.cdt.org/security/010920bill_text.pdf
For DOJ analysis of second draft of MATA, i.e. ATA, see
http://www.cdt.org/security/010919terror.pdf Draft 9/19 12:30 pm [ET] Since then
MATA and ATA has been interchangeably used to refer to both drafts. As late as
September 24, 2001, the AG still referred to the second draft MATA, when people
outside the administration have correctly identity it as ATA. See “ATTORNEY
GENERAL ASHCROFT OUTLINES MOBILIZATION AGAINST TERRORISM
ACT,” USDOJ September 24, 2001.
http://www.usdoj.gov/opa/pr/2001/September/492ag.htm
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would be ready by Friday (September 14, 2001).73 Dinh was assisted by
David Carp, a DOJ lawyer who helped drafted the Oklahoma City (1995)
anti-terrorism measures, 74 with input for John Yoo75 who later co-authored a
repot finding that Geneva Conventions do not apply to Taliban or Al Qaeda
fighters as a matter of international law because Afghanistan was a "failed
state".76
In the course of business and little over six weeks a 20 – 30 pages of MATA
– ATA turned into a document which was 131 pages in length with 1016
different sections.
According to Dinh his first order of business was to consult law enforcement
agents and prosecutors all over the nation for their ideas on how best to fight
terrorism, in the short term and over the long haul.77 The three criteria for
73

Steven Brill, After: How American Confronted the September 12 Era (N.Y.: Simon &
Shuster, 2003), p. 52.
74
Steven Brill, After: How American Confronted the September 12 Era (N.Y.: Simon &
Shuster, 2003), p. 53.
75
It is of interest to note that two Asian-Americans were appointed to leadership position
in leading the legal charge on war on terror, domestically (Dinh) and internationally
(Yoo). Was this a case of co-incidence? (Asian-Americas, especially in public law, are
not in abundance inside and outside the Administration.) Was this a case of ideological
compatibility, i.e. Asian Americans are more conservative minded when it comes to
defense issues? (Dinh was a member of the Federalist Society.) Was this a case of
strategic deployment, i.e. to make it appears that war on terror is not one of white vs.
colored. Was this a case of meritorious appointment, i.e. Asian Americans in general and
Dinh and Yoo in particular were distinguished legal professionals of their own right. Both
of them came from ranked law schools. Both of them ended up as law professors. Was
this a case of Bush (affirmative action) policy at work, e.g. Bush has a track record of
appointing high profile government jobs to minorities – Powel and Rice at State and
Gonzalez at Justice. The investigation of the role played by Asian American in war on
terror should be revealing of Bush’s administration management philosophy and style, in
turn shed light on the USA PATRIOT ACT’s passage.
76
"Application of Treaties and Laws to Al Qaeda and Taliban Detainees" (Jan. 9. 2002)
(with Robert J. Delahunty). See “THE BUSH ADMINISTRATION TORTURE MEMO
SCANDAL,” http://texscience.org/reform/torture/
77
This consultation process (if substantiated) contradicted the common impression and
repeated allegations that the Bush administration have no done enough to incorporate
different ideas and opposing views in the drafting process. Alternative, the USA
PATRIOT ACT was an ideological statement, not a consultative or consultation
document. A question still remains, why was the ATA – MATA – USA PATRIOT ACT
not distributed for comments through the proper channels, i.e. through OMB onto each
and every related and affected agencies.
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suggestions from the field were: operationally necessity, limited impact on
civil liberties, and conformity with Constitutionality. All told, fifty of the
legislative proposals were compiled and submitted, most of them have been
proposed and considered before, in one form or another.78 In fact, many of
the proposed provisions in the MATA of 2001 were in fact off the shelf
items from the 1996 anti-terrorism legislation, including roving wiretaps,
releasing of customers’ information from telephone and Internet companies,
and seizing of personal property.79 Additional provisions of the proposed
MATA included measures which: made it possible for law enforcement
officials to obtain e-mail message header information and gather web
browsing patterns without a wiretap order; 80 dilute judicial supervision and
control over roving wiretaps;81 permit law enforcement to share wiretap
information with the Executive branch;82 reduce restrictions on Foreign
Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) allowing it to be used domestically;83
allow grand jury evidence to be shared with the US intelligence
community;84 permit the President to designate any "foreign-directed
individual, group, or entity," including any United States citizen or
organization as fitting for FISA surveillance;85 preventing people from
exercising their first amendment rights in discussion terrorism related
matters;86 establish a DNA database for every criminals and certain sex
offenders unrelated to terrorism.87
Meantime, the first attempt to organize different opposition interest groups
into a viable political force started to take shape, and has since been a thorn
78

This detracted from opponents’ argument that the USA PATRIOT ACT provisions
needed to be thoroughly researched and critically examined. See Viet Dinh Inerview.
79 There was an inconsistency in positions offered by the opponents to the Act, i.e. the
USA PATRIOT ACT contained new and invasive provisions vs. USA PATRIOT ACT
contained old and contested provisions. Jennifer Van Bergen, “The USA PATRIOT Act
Was Planned Before 9/11,” Truthout.org, 20 May, 2002 (“Many people do not know that
the USA PATRIOT Act was already written and ready to go long before September
11th.”) http://www.truthout.org/docs_02/05.21B.jvb.usapa.911.htm
80
SEC. 103. MODIFICATION OF AUTHORITIES RELATING TO USE OF PEN
REGISTERS AND TRAP AND TRACE DEVICES (2) (A) and 3 (B).
81
SEC. 106. MULTI-POINT WIRETAPS.
82
.SEC. 108. AUTHORIZED DISCLOSURE.
83
SEC. 157. PEN REGISTER AND TRAP AND TRACE AUTHORITY.
84
SEC. 154. FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION SHARING.
85
SEC. 156, DEFINITION.
86
SEC. 202. DEFINITIONS RELATING TO TERRORISM
87
SEC. 356. DNA IDENTIFICATION OF TERRORISTS
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to the administration effort in ushering a garrison state. The impetus and
agenda for the organization effort was bested summed up by Net Hentoff, a
longtime activities of civil rights causes and key members to the group:
To save our liberties, we have to organize nationally—as was
done effectively in the civil rights and antiwar campaigns of the
1960s. There are already a large number of groups that can and
should form an organizing and educational network to put ads
in newspapers and on radio and television, set up teach-ins on
campuses and in town meetings around the country, and plan a
March on Washington on the order of the 1963 assembly
addressed by Martin Luther King ("I Have a Dream").88
On September 14, 2001 (Thursday), Halperin and ACLU called a meeting of
interested parties and concerned groups at the ACLU white townhouse in
D.C. to discuss strategy as to how to deal with anticipated legislative and
administration clamp down on civil liberties in the name of national security.
The meeting was precipitated by the rush of 9/11 legislations having the
effect of eroding established Constitutional rights. The meeting was well
attended by different interest groups. These groups came from across the
political spectrum as representing different ideologies, interests and agenda;
converging in opposing the government’s civil rights depriving antiterrorism drive. For example, People for the American Way was formed in
the 1981 to fight the insidious influence of the extreme right such as rightwing televangelists, including Jerry Falwell, Pat Robertson and Jimmy
Swaggart. In joining the coalition, it was most concerned with
compromising of civil rights and minorities rights. 89 Project on
Government Accountability (George Mason University) formed to improve
government policy and decision making by promoting open policy choice
and informed decisions through cost-benefit analysis. In joining the
coalition, it sought to promote government accountability through a more
open process.90 The Free Congress Foundation are political and moral
conservatives dedicated to preserving traditional American way of life, e.g.
88

Nat Hentoff, “Getting Back Our Rights Don’t Brood and Despair. Organize!” Village
Voce, December 7th, 2001 2:45 PM
http://www.villagevoice.com/news/0150,hentoff,30634,6.html
89
“Statement of People for the American Way President G Ralph Neas.” September 20,
2001. http://www.indefenseoffreedom.org/statements/pfaw_release.pdf
90
“Whistle Blowers are Modern Paul Reveres Against Terrorism,” September 20, 2001
http://www.indefenseoffreedom.org/statements/gap_release.pdf
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Judeo-Christian Western culture. As such it is against expansion of Federal
power at the expense of the state and encroachment of individual rights by
the government.91 Finally, “The Competitive Enterprise Institute is a nonprofit public policy organization dedicated to advancing the principles of
free enterprise and limited government.” In joining the coalition, it sought to
reduce government regulation of business and restriction of free market in
the name or as a result of war on terrorism.92
The coalition decided to issue a 10 points public statement calling for more
rational debate:
1.

2.
3.
4.

5.
6.
7.

IN DEFENSE OF FREEDOM93
On September 11, 2001 thousands of people lost their lives in a
brutal assault on the American people and the American form
of government. We mourn the loss of these innocent lives and
insist that those who perpetrated these acts be held accountable.
This tragedy requires all Americans to examine carefully the
steps our country may now take to reduce the risk of future
terrorist attacks.
We need to consider proposals calmly and deliberately with a
determination not to erode the liberties and freedoms that are at
the core of the American way of life.
We need to ensure that actions by our government uphold the
principles of a democratic society, accountable government and
international law, and that all decisions are taken in a manner
consistent with the Constitution.
We can, as we have in the past, in times of war and of peace,
reconcile the requirements of security with the demands of
liberty.
We should resist the temptation to enact proposals in the
mistaken belief that anything that may be called anti-terrorist
will necessarily provide greater security.
We should resist efforts to target people because of their race,
religion, ethnic background or appearance, including
immigrants in general, Arab Americans and Muslims.

91

. “Free Congress: Established Online Petition” September 20,
2001http://www.indefenseoffreedom.org/statements/freecongress_release.pdf
92
http://www.cei.org/pages/about.cfm
93
The statements in text is a verbatim account from http://www.indefenseoffreedom.org/
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8. We affirm the right of peaceful dissent, protected by the First
Amendment, now, when it is most at risk.
9. We should applaud our political leaders in the days ahead who
have the courage to say that our freedoms should not be limited.
10.We must have faith in our democratic system and our
Constitution, and in our ability to protect at the same time both
the freedom and the security of all Americans.
The “In Defense of Freedom statement” was endorsed by more than
150 organizations, 94 300 law professors, and 40 computer scientists.95
On a Sunday, September 16, 2001, AG John Ashcroft made public his
intention to ask Congress to write tougher anti-terrorist laws and authorized
more powers to fight terrorism. Subsequently on Monday, September 17,
2001, Ashcroft discussed the details of anti-terrorist package he intended to
send to the Congress:
“Yesterday I met with several members of the House and
Senate leadership, including the leadership of the Intelligence
and Judiciary Committees. FBI Director Mueller and I
discussed with them the current threat assessment, including
our believe that associates of the hijackers that have ties to
terrorist organizations may be a continuing presence in the
United States. This threat assessment has helped us to identify
several areas where we should strengthen our laws to increase
the ability of the Department of Justice and its component
agencies to identify, prevent and punish terrorism ...In the next
few days, we intend to finalize a package of legislative
measures that will be comprehensive. Areas covered include

94

Other groups included NAACP Board of Directors; National Association of Criminal
Defense Lawyers; National Council of Churches of Christ, National Council of La Raza,
National Gay and Lesbian Task Force, National Lawyers Guild, National Native
American Bar Association, NOW Legal Defense and Education Fund, Physicians for
Human Rights, Rutherford Institute; the American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Committee;
American Federation of State, County, and Municipal Employees; Amnesty International
USA; Baptist Joint Committee on Public Affairs; Center for Constitutional Rights; Free
Congress Foundation; Gun Owners of America; Leadership Conference on Civil Rights.
95
http://www.indefenseoffreedom.org/
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criminal justice, immigration, intelligence gathering and
financial infrastructure...”96
The proposed anti-terrorists legislation promised to substantially enhance
intelligence gathering capacity of law enforcement officials, including:
First, allowing wiretapping of person, instead on just phone number:
“And given the nature and availability of literally disposable
telephones in modern society, we need to be able to have the
court authority to monitor, not the phone, but the telephone
communications of a person .”97
Second, allowing for nationally valid wiretapping order (“roving”):
“so that one wiretap approval can be obtained for all jurisdictions working
on an investigation, particularly given the mobility of individuals and the
capacity of individuals who are mobile to communicate.”98
Third, making sure that terrorism offenses received the same amount of
attention and priority as other serious crimes in terms of statute of
limitations and penalty.
“For example, we are identifying instances where the law
currently makes it easier to prosecute drug trafficking and
organized crime or espionage than it is to prosecute
terrorism…A person who harbors a person involved in
espionage is subject to stiffer penalties than a person who
harbors an individual involved in terrorism. We think this
reflects an inadequate response to the kind of threat that
terrorism poses to our culture.” 99
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Attorney General John Ashcroft Remarks, Press Briefing with FBI Director Robert
Mueller, FBI headquarters, September 17, 2001.
http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/sept_11/doj_brief002.htm
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Id.
98
Id.
99
Id.
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Finally, the proposed legislation make: “providing material support or
resources to a terrorist organization an offense that would enable us to
prosecute someone under the money laundering statutes.”100
On September 19, 2001 congressional members, White House and justice
department leadership gathered formally to exchange proposals and
informally to negotiate for compromise. AG John Ashcroft distributed the
proposed MATA to members of Congress after Monday's press
conference.101 The AG further “demanded” the MATA to be passed within
the week, i.e. two days,102 with a dire warning issued on September 24,
2001 at a Congressional hearing:
"Everyday that passes with outdated statutes and the old rules
of engagement, each day that so passes is a day that terrorists
have a competitive advantage. Until Congress makes these
changes we are fighting an unnecessary uphill battle." 103
While the MATA was not well received on the Hill,104 the Congress
nevertheless promised expedited action. House Judiciary Committee
100
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Chairman F. James Sensenbrenner, Jr. (R-Wis.) issued a statement
immediately upon receipt of the MATA:
“intend to have the House Judiciary Committee hold a
legislative hearing followed by a full committee markup as
soon as possible once legislation is introduced. This fair and
deliberate schedule will allow for a full debate as well as
expedited consideration by the full House.”105
In the face of MATA, EFF Executive Director Shari Steele raised the
recurring concern with emergency legislations and framed the ensuring
debate to follow as one of liberty vs. security: "While it is obviously of vital
national importance to respond effectively to terrorism, this bill recalls the
McCarthy era in the power it would give the government to scrutinize the
private lives of American citizens."
The EFF immediate issued a public statement, the first of many salvos,
against the MATA:
“One particularly egregious section of the DOJ's analysis of its
proposed legislation says that "United States prosecutors may
use against American citizens information collected by a
foreign government even if the collection would have violated
the Fourth Amendment." 106
EFF Senior Staff Attorney Lee Tien followed with the observation that
lesser liberty might not give us more security: "Operating from abroad,
foreign governments will do the dirty work of spying on the communications
of Americans worldwide. US protections against unreasonable search and
seizure won't matter." 107
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The EFF further called upon its member to protest against he impending
anti-terrorism laws, starting with a nation wide write in campaign. 108
Originally, AG Ashcroft with the assistance of Rep. James Sensenbrenner
(R-WI), Chairman of the House Judiciary Committee, was counting on a
speedy passage of this legislation. Rep. Sensenbrenner planned to hold
hearings on Monday (9/24), conduct a mark up session on Tuesday (9/25),
and then take the bill to the House floor for final passage before the House
breaks for the Yom Kippur holiday on Thursday (9/27). However, at the
Committee hearing on Monday afternoon all Committee Democrats and a
few Republicans expressed grave opposition to this schedule. By the end of
the hearing Rep. Sensenbrenner agreed to postpone mark up for another
week, i.e. into October.
Meanwhile, Sen. Patrick Leahy (D-VT), Chairman of the Senate Judiciary
Committee, has already indicated that it might take his Committee weeks to
pass a bill. The senate Judicial Committee was scheduled to hold a hearing
on Tuesday, September 25, 2001.
Once tabled, ATA was widely attacked from liberal and conservatives alike.
President George Bush has to come to its defense. On September 25, 2001,
he advocated for the ATA in a policy speech at FBI:
“I hope Congress will listen to the wisdom of the proposals that
the Attorney General brought up, to give the tools necessary to
our agents in the field to find those who may think they want to
disrupt America again. We're asking Congress for the authority
to hold suspected terrorists who are in the process of being
deported, until they're deported. That seems to make sense
…And we're asking for the authority to share information
between intelligence operations and law enforcement … the
proposals we've made on Capitol Hill, carried by the Attorney
General, has been carefully reviewed. They are measured
requests, they are responsible requests, they are constitutional
requests…And in order to win the war, we must make sure that
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the law enforcement men and women have got the tools
necessary, within the Constitution, to defeat the enemy.” 109
On September 27, 2001, President Bush issued another statement in support
at the CIA:
"I intend to continue to work with Congress to make sure that
our law enforcement officials at home have got the tools
necessary -- obviously, within the confines of our Constitution - to make sure the homeland is secure; to make sure America
can live as peacefully as possible; to make sure that we run
down every threat, take serious every incident. And we've got
to make sure, as well, that those who work for the nation
overseas have got the best available technologies and the best
tools and the best funding possible."
On September 29, 2001, President, as consistent with his political
style, was compelled to by pass the Congress and directly appeal to
the people in his weekly radio address:
"I'm asking Congress for new law enforcement authority, to
better track the communications of terrorists, and to detain
suspected terrorists until the moment they are deported. I will
also seek more funding and better technology for our country's
intelligence community." 110transcript.
Meantime, on September 24, 2001, the House Judiciary Committee held a
“briefing” for civil liberties groups regarding the ATA of 2001. 111 As
expected, critics of the ATA raised substantial civil rights concerns.112
Including:
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James Dempsey as with Morton Halperin113 both objected to proposed
changes to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) and associated
electronic surveillance procedures. The CDT was also displeased with
defining hacking as terrorism and allowing (authorizing and obligating) IPS
to monitor clients account.114
While Greg Nojeim (ACLU) raised electronic surveillance issues, David
Cole (Georgetown University Law Center) articulated immigration
concerns. For Brad Jansen (Free Congress Foundation), he was concerned
money laundering and forfeiture issues and Rachel King (ACLU) were
concerned with criminal law problems.115
Finally, People For the American Way had called for public hearings on the
administration's legislation, and urged members of Congress to pass
legislation only when they adhered to three basic principles:
(1) The provisions should be carefully drafted to preserve
constitutional liberties and to prevent abuse of power;
(2) There should be meaningful judicial review and strict congressional
oversight;
(3) Anti-terrorism laws should be narrowly tailored to achieve clearly
stated goals and objectives. 116

November 26, 2003) (Rep. Jerrold Nadler (D-N.Y.) was unwilling to allow the AG to
decide whether an alien should be detained indefinitely as national security threat. Rep.
Barney Frank (D-Mass.) was concerned with allowing the FBI to spy on American,
risking the “inappropriate release of information”, as with the case Rev. Martin Luther
King Jr. Judiciary Committee members Reps. Maxine Waters (D-Calif.) and Bob Barr
(R-Ga.) did not want to rush the Patriot Act without the proper hearing and deliberation,
since many of the provisions are very controversial (computer surveillance) and were
rejected by the committee before.)
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The AG’s pushed for early adoption of ATA backfired for a number of
reasons. First, the AG has failed to discuss with the White House and
consulted with key administrative officials before making the ATA public.117
It was a very much behind the scene affairs by DOJ legal staff, under the
leadership of Dinh. For example, Josh Bolten the deputy chief of staff of the
White House was kept in the dark until the ninth hour. Likewise, the White
House legal counsel’s office and legislative affairs office was not advised.
None of the government departments were advised, informed, notified or
consulted over the ATA. They did not even have a copy of the proposal
before Monday September 17, 2001. 118
Second, the AG has failed to sought support from key Congressional
leadership, choosing to adopt an us (administration) vs. them (the world –
court, Congress, interest groups, dissenters) attitude and take it or leave it
approach. In this regard, the Bush administration has decided early on the
USA PATRIOT ACT legislative process not to seek a negotiated
compromise but preferred an imposed, all or nothing, solution. For example,
the powerful Republic chairman of the Judiciary Committee, Sensenbrenner,
heard about the ATA package on the morning of September 16, 2001 at
home while Ashcroft was making the announcement on TV of things to
come in a talk show.119 House Speaker Dennis Hasket was likewise not
informed.120 Sensenbrenner was finally given a fax copy of the proposed
ATA in the evening.121
The first sign of trouble came when Sensenbrenner informed Ashcroft that
while he was eager to work with Ashcroft to produce a good legislation with
bi-partisan support, his cooperation was not to be taken for granted. Still, the
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Ashcroft was unyielding and unapologetic.122 To demonstrate his
seriousness and power, Sensenbrenner insisted upon having the AG removed
the suspension of habeas provision in the original ATA draft before the ATA
could move forward.123
Third, the AG underestimated the political resistant he was to encounter,
particularly from members of his own party, such as Bob Barr. He certainly
did not anticipate ACLU joining cause with Bob Barr in seeking the delay, if
not derailment, of the ATA. 124 On September 21, 2001 (Friday), Bob Barr
with four other members of the House Judiciary Committee sent a letter,
drafted by ACLU, to Sensenbrenner listing their concerns with the ATA as
proposed. The letter particularly listing ten provisions that required
significant “further public debate” before adopted. 125 These included: (1)
wiretapping a cell phone number; (2) allowing for FISA order when “a”
purpose of investigation was to obtain foreign intelligence; (3) authorizing
“sneak and peek” search and seizure without notification to the suspect; (4)
approving search warrant without probable cause; (5) allowing FBI to obtain
Internet or library records in secret and without judicial oversight; (6)
detaining non-citizens indefinitely; (7) allowing seizure of terrorists assets
before hearing. 126 The letter sealed the fate of earlier passage of the ATA as
planned. By September 25, 2001 ATA was dead on arrival. 127
The USA ACT
The democratic response to ATA (later PATRIOT ACT) was the USA
ACT Senate bill 1510128 introduced on October 4th.129 Originally it was to be
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tabled for a vote on October 9, 2004. But in the last minute, after an allnight negotiation by the Senate leadership the USA bill was withdrawn. A
brand new “bi-partisan” bill was introduced. The majority leader, Senator
Thomas Daschle of South Dakota, called for unanimous consent to bring the
bill to a floor vote without debate or amendment. This was postponed for
two days to accommodate Senator Feingold’s amendments.130 The Senate
finally passed the USA ACT on October 11th 2001 131 after a brief (4 hours)
of debate.132
The USA ACT was a negotiated anti-terrorism legislation between
Democratic Chairman Patrick Leahy and Republican Ranking Member
Orrin Hatch of the Senate Judiciary Committee and with the White House
and the Department of Justice over a period of two weeks, before it was
derailed. The negotiation was a difficult, tortuous and meandering one. The
difficulties resulted as much from bitter partisanship in Senate as it is from
an overbearing AG.
Partisanship was everywhere in evident. Senators voted along party line.
For example, provisions that have been rejected by prior Republican
Senators as encroachment on liberty under the Clinton administration was
now embraced by the same Senators as promoting security of the nation post
9/11. “In fact, then Sen. Ashcroft voted to table that amendment, and my
good friend from Utah, Senator Hatch, spoke against it and opined, "I do not
the chairmen of the Banking and Intelligence Committees, Senator Sarbanes, Senator
Graham of Florida, Senator Hatch, and Senator Shelby introduced the USA ACT on
October 4, 2001.
130
Senate Debate on The Uniting and Strengthening America Act of 2001, Congressional
Record: October 11, 2001 (Senate), Page S10547-S10630,
S10570http://www.fas.org/sgp/congress/2001/s101101.html
131
While the final USA PATRIOT Act is much improvement over the original
(September 19, 2001 MATA aka ATA) draft, it did not go far enough in protecting
citizens’ rights. For example, the original Administration proposal allowed the use of
foreign law enforcement agencies wiretapped information in U.S. criminal proceedings
against U.S. citizens; the freezing of non-criminal before trial and conviction; obtaining
of educational records without a court order. All of them removed or revised in the final
bill. “Statement of Senator Patrick Leahy The Uniting And Strengthening of America Act
Of 2001 ("USA ACT")” (October 9, 2001)
http://leahy.senate.gov/press/200110/100901a.html
132
Senate Debate on The Uniting and Strengthening America Act of 2001,
Congressional Record: October 11, 2001 (Senate), Page S10547-S10630
http://www.fas.org/sgp/congress/2001/s101101.html
33

think we should expand the wiretap laws any further. " I recall Senator
Hatch’s concern then that "We must ensure that in our response to recent
terrorist acts, we do not destroy the freedoms that we cherish."133
An overbearing AG was abundantly demonstrated by an AG who used 9/11
terrorism threat to make opposing lawmakers followed the Administration
line, silently and compliantly. Those who spoke up to the Administration
were not only considered as disloyal, but viewed as unpatriotic (in
questioning the USA PATRIOT ACT.) An overbearing AG was also
demonstrated by an AG who would not keep to his promise on negotiated
anti-terrorism terms, and instead faulted the democrats for not acting fast
enough to approve the Administration’s frequently changed anti-terrorism
bill. As recalled bitterly by Senator Leahy:
“On several key issues that are of particular concern to me, we
had reached an agreement with the Administration on Sunday,
September 30. Unfortunately, within two days, the
Administration announced that it was reneging on the deal. I
appreciate the complex task of considering the concerns and
missions of multiple federal agencies, and that sometimes
agreements must be modified as their implications are
scrutinized by affected agencies.” 134
For example, negotiated agreement on allowing for judicial supervision of
grand jury testimony released to executive branch for intelligence purposes
was reneged within two days of September 30.135
The USA ACT incorporate proposed provisions from Senator Leahy's initial
package of the USA ACT;136 Intelligence Committee provisions sponsored
by Intelligence Committee Chairman Bob Graham137 and committee
133
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member Dianne Feinstein; Banking Committee money laundering
provisions138 and other provisions proposed by other senators. The primary
objective of the USA ACT was to seek a more balanced approach to provide
security for the nation in the backdrop of 9/11 through negotiation,
compromise and above all else bi-partisan cooperation. As Senator Patrick
Leahy put it:
This is not the bill that I, or any of the sponsors, would have
written if compromise were unnecessary. Nor is the bill the
Administration initially proposed and the Attorney General
delivered to us on September 19, at a meeting in the Capitol.
We were able to refine and supplement the Administration’s
original proposal in a number of ways. The Administration
accepted a number of the practical steps I had originally
proposed on September 19 to improve our security on the
Northern Border, assist our federal, state and local law
enforcement officers and provide compensation to the victims
of terrorist acts and to the public safety officers who gave their
lives to protect ours. This USA Act also provides important
checks on the proposed expansion of government powers that
were not contained in the Attorney General’s initial proposal.
In negotiations with the Administration, I have done my best to
strike a reasonable balance between the need to address the
threat of terrorism, which we all keenly feel at the present time,
and the need to protect our constitutional freedoms. Despite my
misgivings, I have consented to some of the Administration’s
proposals because it is important to preserve national unity in
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this time of crisis and to move the legislative process forward.
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The USA ACT, as proposed, was an unfinished business; a work in progress
subject to further Party – Administration negotiation, House Judiciary
Committee legislative proposals,140 court scrutiny (on Constitutionality), and
Senate Judicial Committee oversight hearings (in practice).141
Substantively, the USA ACT was more comprehensive in scope, define in
focus, integrative in approach and broad in operations. For example, in
terms of scope, the ACT was not contented with giving the federal
government more power to fighting terrorism but also seek to provide
compensation for victims and liabilities for terrorism workers.142 In terms of
focus, the ACT was not contended with paying lip service to protecting civil
liberties and individual rights but also make clear that “hate crime” against
Islamic people was not acceptable.143 In terms of integration, the ACT was
not only relying on the federal government to fight terrorism but invite and
139
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engage the state and local authority to local law enforcement authorities to
play a key role.144 In terms of broadness, the ACT was not contended to
fighting terrorism after the fact but sought to prevent terrorists from coming
to the U.S. through strengthening the Northern border.145
The lone dissenter to the USA ACT was Senator Feingold (D-Wisconsin.
His major concerns were four folds. First, the nation should not rush to
judgment; haste makes waste. 146 The Senate should take time to do things
right, even if this means to slow down the process. Second, as a nation we
should learn from history and not made the same mistakes we did when we
passed the Alien and Sedition Acts and suspended habeas corpus during the
Civil War, interned Japanese-Americans during World War II, blacklisted
communist sympathizers during the McCarthy era, and harassed antiwar
protesters during the Vietnam war.147 Third, the Senate has an important
Constitutional role to play in providing meaningful scrutiny for the bill.148
Fourth, the Administration should not be allowed to use the occasion to seek
unlimited powers.149 Fifth, the nation should fight security without
destroying civil liberties.
Specifically, Feingold supported the idea of "roving wiretaps" but objected
to its indiscriminate application to situation to permit eavesdrop when the
targeted person is not the one using the phone. He objected to allowing the
police to have access to any typed or stored or “tangible” information with
administrative order, except under court supervision. He objected to “sneak
and peek” which allowed the police to search people’s place without
notifying the person. He objected to allow system administrators at
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universities or libraries to monitor private net activities of "computer
trespasser." 150
When USA ACT came to a floor vote, Senate Feingold negotiated for three
amendments, all of them were defeated, though not without some consoling
support from colleagues.
FROM PATRIOT ACT to USA PATRIOAT ACT
The current USA PATRIOT ACT found its genesis in the PATRIOT
ACT, introduced as House bill 2975 on October 2, 2001.151 The PATRIOT
ACT incorporated most of the administration ATA provisions and expanded
on them.152 The PATRIOT ACT was the negotiated produce of In the
Republican Congressman Jim Sensenbrenner of Wisconsin, Chairman of the
Judiciary Committee, and Ranking Democrat from Michigan, John Conyers,
the ranking Democrat. “On October 12, 2001, after another all-night
drafting session, a text was produced that had only minor changes from the
Senate-passed bill. It was rushed to the floor and passed with only three
Republican and 75 Democratic votes in opposition. Thus by Friday, October
12, both houses had passed nearly identical antiterrorism bills.”
House and senate leaders work to resolve the differences between HR2975
and S1510. The work was interpreted by anthrax attack on the Hill. Issues
were unresolved for a week.
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The negotiation and compromise between the House (HR2975) and Senate
(S1510) fell in the following areas:
Major compromise between House and Senate PATRIOT Bill
Provisions
Sunset clause
McDades law153

Original House
version
5 years
None

Money
laundering
provisions

None

Informationsharing
154
provisions155

Sharing
information
subject to prior
court
authorization
None

Electronic
surveillance
note

Certification of
alien as
terrorists

Declaration of
alien as terrorist
limited to Deputy
AG

Revisit of alien
terrorists
certification

Revisit of alien
terrorists
certification

Senate version
None
Revisions to
McDade
None

Sharing
information
without notice to
court

Compromise
4 years
None
Comprehensive
Money
laundering
provisions
Sharing with
notice to the
court after
disclosure.

None

Ex parte and in
camera notice
with the court
when a lawful
pen register or
trap and trace
order is install on
ISP.
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alien as terrorist
limited to
Commissioner of
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alien as terrorist
limited to Deputy
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every 6 months.
None

every 6 months
None
Authorized 36
Electronic
millions for
tacking of
implementation
foreign students
of SEVIS.
None
Established
Accountability: None
Inspector General
Inspection
for Civil
Liberties and
Civil Rights
inside the
Department of
Justice.
None
Provide for
Accountability: None
Federal tort relief
Court liability
for improper
government
release of wiretap
information.
Source: Extracted form House floor debate, USA PATRIOT ACT, October
23, 2001. Congressional Record: October 23, 2001 (House) Page H7159H7207
On October 23rd 1001, the USA PATRIOT ACT was debated in the House
for one hour. The major objections concerned two major issues: i.e.
legislative procedure and due process:
First the legislative process was considered highly usual and irregular. The
draft bill was reported out the House Judiciary Committee 36-0. But that bill
was jettisoned in lieu of a new one negotiated by the Congressional
leadership and behind closed door, without input from the Committee or
House members. The Congressional members were informed of the change,
afterward. Each Party was given two copies of the bill shortly before the
floor debate on October 23, 2001. No amendments were entertained. The
debate was held late at night and after working hours. As a result most
members were ignorant of the content of the bill when asked to vote on the
it. Representative Frank (D – Mass.) found the process unacceptable:
There is no reason why we could not have had this open to
amendment tonight. This bill should not be debated now. Was it
40

really necessary to debate one of the most profound pieces of
legislation and its impact on our society that we have had, was
it really necessary to debate it at night after all of the Members
who have been working all day were told to go home? Why
could this not have been a full-fledged debate with some
amendments?156
Mr. Conyers likewise complained:
The members of the Committee on the Judiciary had a free and
open debate; and we came to a bill that even though imperfect,
was unanimously agreed on. That was removed from us, and
we are now debating at this hour of night, with only two copies
of the bill that we are being asked to vote on available to
Members on this side of the aisle. I am hoping on the other side
of the aisle they at least have two copies…there is something
wrong with that process….79 Members were not able to go
along with the bill, is that a legislative body that does not
debate is being railroaded whether they know it or not, whether
they want to accede to it or not.157
Some members also complaint of the lack of due process for citizens and
likely abuse of power by the government. For example, Representative
Jackson – Lee (D – Texas) was heard to complained:
Mr. Speaker, I think Americans know very well that character is
judged not so much on how a man or woman acts in the good
times, but how we act in the face of adversity …I do believe
that in making our country safe against terrorism, that we do
not necessarily need to do away with due process, and that we
should not target innocent people unfairly because of their race,
color, sexual orientation, creed, gender, or religion.158
Other criticism was more pointed and specific. For example, Mr Scott (DVA)159 observed that:
156
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First, the new wiretap power was not limited to intelligence gathering but
broad enough to be used to investigate common crime and innocent citizens;
Second, there were very little protection against the abusive use of wire tape,
e.g. no probable caused is required for foreign intelligence search warrant.
Third, pen register and track and trace violate people’s privacy right and
protection form government search and seizure power;
Fourth. the government was allowed to conduct secret searches,
so-called sneak and peak without telling the target.160
Finally, on October 25th the final bill, HR 3162, the "USA PATRIOT ACT"
was debate in the Senate and passed.161 The floor debate was a tightly
managed one. Except for Senator Feingold, only those who were involved
in the drafting or negotiation process were allowed to participate in the
debate. “The PRESIDENT pro tempore. The chairman and ranking member
of the Judiciary Committee have 90 minutes each; the Senator from
Michigan, Mr. Levin, has 10 minutes; the Senator from Minnesota, Mr.
Wellstone, has 10 minutes; the Senator from Maryland, Mr. Sarbanes, has 20
minutes; the Senator from Wisconsin, Mr. Feingold, has 1 hour; the Senator
from Florida, Mr. Graham, has 15 minutes; and the Senator from
Pennsylvania, Mr. Specter, has 15 minutes.” 162
Senator Leady open the debate with the emphatic observation that the bill
was a hard earned compromise: “This was not the bill that I, or any of the
sponsors, would have written if compromise was unnecessary. Nor was it the
bill the Administration had initially proposed and the Attorney General
delivered to us on September 19, at a meeting in the Capitol.”163
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He was also quick to point out that: First, the bill was a much improved
legislation from the September 19, 2001 Administration proposal (ATA –
MATA); Second, that both of Senate and Administration has made much
concession; Third, that important safeguard was in place against government
abuse of power and protection of rights; Fourth, that the bill, even if passed,
would be a work in progress, subject to supervision by court and monitoring
by Senate, revisions and amendments along the way.
As to improvements, the Senator named ten areas that the ACT has
improved from the Administrative proposal of September 19, 2001:164
First, improved security on the Northern Border;
Second, added money laundering provisions;
Third, added programs to enhance information sharing and coordination
with State and local law enforcement, grants to State and local governments
to respond to bioterrorism, and to increase payments to families of fallen
firefighters, police officers and other public safety workers;
Fourth, added humanitarian relief to immigrant victims of the September 11
terrorist attacks;
Fifth, added help to the FBI to hire translators;
Sixth, added more comprehensive victims assistance;
Seventh, added measures to fight cybercrime;
Eighth, added measures to fight terrorism against mass transportation
systems;
Ninth, added important measures to use technology to make our borders
more secure;
Tenth, able to include additional important checks on the proposed
expansion of government powers contained in the Attorney General's initial
proposal.165
As to supervision and oversight. Senator Leahy observed:
“I do believe that some of the provisions contained both in this

bill and the original USA Act will face difficult tests in the
courts, and that we in Congress may have to revisit these issues
at some time in the future when the present crisis has passed,
the sunset has expired or the courts find an infirmity in these
164
165

S10091.
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provisions. I also intend as Chairman of the Judiciary
Committee to exercise careful oversight of how the Department
of Justice, the FBI and other executive branch agencies are
using the newly-expanded powers that this bill will give them. I
know that other members of the Judiciary Committee—
including Senator Specter, Senator Grassley, and Senator
Durbin--appreciate the importance of such oversight.166
It was signed into law by President G.W. Bush on October 26th.
III
A Failure of Process?
There is a common perception that the USA PATRIOT ACT registered a
failure of legislative process, citing a lack of public information, official
consultation and Congressional scrutiny. When the USA PATRIOT ACT
came before the House of Representative on October 23, 2001,
Representative Scott has this to say:
First of all, I think it is appropriate to comment on the process
by which the bill is coming to us. This is not the bill that was
reported and deliberated on in the Committee on the Judiciary.
It came to us late on the floor. No one has really had an
opportunity to look at the bill to see what is in it since we have
been out of our offices. The report has just come to us. It would
be helpful if we would wait for some period of time so that we
can at least review what we are voting on, but I guess that is not
going to stop us, so here we are.167
An interesting research issues presented itself: To what extent and in what
manner did the final USA PATRIOT ACT incorporated public sentiments
and reflected popular interests, e.g. how was the positions of various interest
groups or perspectives of affected parties taken into account? In a broader
context, what was the role and contribution of various interest groups in
shaping the content and process of USA PATRIOT ACT, originated as
ATA? For example, ACLU working with Bob Bar in the House and in the
166
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Senate was able to alter the course and tamper the thrust of the ATA. Many
progressive and conservatives non-profit groups have worked to cut back the
scope and reach of the PATRIOT Act, including: (1) People for American
Way Foundation. PFAWF founded was 1981 by Norman Lear, Barbara
Jordan and others “to counter the growing clout and divisive message of
right-wing televangelists, including Jerry Falwell, Pat Robertson and Jimmy
Swaggart.” Since then it has worked against the spread and influence of
Radial Right, e.g. challenged the nomination of Judge Bork to the Supreme
Court (1987) or worked against preaching of creationism (2001).168 PFAWF
position on and contribution to USA PATRIOT Act is best captured by
PFAWF’s letter to Congress: “Letter from Ralph G. Neas to Congress on
Anti-Terrorism Legislation,” (October 9, 2001):
“In our October 1 letter to all Members of Congress, we urge
that any amendments and the final legislation reflect the
following principles: Language should be carefully crafted in
order to preserve constitutional liberties and to prevent the
creation of overly broad powers that could lead to abuse.
Meaningful judicial review and oversight should not be shortcircuited. Anti-terrorism laws should be narrowly tailored to
that purpose. In particular, we are mindful of the importance of
these issues and their scope in final legislation: a narrowly
tailored definition of terrorism which does not inadvertently
include domestic acts of civil disobedience or other non-violent
activity; clear language exempting the content of Internet
communications from pen register surveillance; meaningful
judicial oversight of any new law enforcement powers for
purposes of surveillance of telephone and Internet
communications; meaningful judicial oversight of information
sharing between intelligence and law enforcement agencies,
coupled with clear separation and a very high wall between
wiretapping conducted for foreign intelligence surveillance, and
that conducted for domestic criminal investigations; and full
due process, including access to counsel and habeas
proceedings, and meaningful limitations on detention prior to
and after filing of charges against alien suspects. Lastly, the
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sunset provisions in the House bill would improve the final
version of this legislation, independent of its content.” 169
With regard to the USA PATRIOT ACT, the CDT170 sought to bring a
balanced perspective to the anti-terrorism legislation by testifying before
Congress, acting as clearing house for drafts and analysis, consulting with
Congressional staff over various drafts; working with other Internet
industrial and interest groups. CDT was successful in resisting “technology
mandate” (Section 216), narrowing “computer trespasser” provision, and
arguing for a “sunset” clause. CDT is also monitoring the implementation of
the USA PATRIOT ACT through its Digital Privacy Working Group and
Internet Caucus Advisory Committee under the auspices of the CDT
Congressional Internet Caucus’ reacting with Congressional oversight, court
litigations, FOIA requests, public education and liaison with various civil
liberties groups, if need be. 171
The only public feedback on the ACT came in the form of letters to
individual Congressman172 or Editorials in the Newspaper. For example, on
September 25, 2001 an editorial entitled “EDITORIAL: Why the rush?” in
the St. Petersburg Times (Florida)173 observed that House Judiciary
Committee Chairman F. James Sensenbrenner Jr. (R-Wis) was rushing the
ATA of 2001 through Congress and the Justice Department was suspected of
169
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using 9/11 to get many of the powers it failed to obtain from Congress in the
past. Observing: “Congress needs to slow down and get this right.” Another
editorial - “An improved antiterrorism bill” – a week later (October 3, 2001)
in the same page 174 observed that Congressional leaders of both parties were
doing their best in crafting a compromised ATA that would give law
enforcement more tools to combat terrorism while protecting civil liberties.
There were many others editorials during the legislative period, e.g. an
editorial in the The Washington Post : “Stampeded in the House,”175 faulted
the House Republican leadership in bypassing the legislative process in
forcing a vote on a major anti-terrorism bill (USA PATRIOT ACT) that was
anonymously drafted the night before without Judiciary Committee
approval, in lieu of one that was unanimously approved by the House
Judiciary Committee. On the day the USA PATRIOT ACT was passed,
October 26, 2001, the Denver Post published an editorial; “EDITORIAL
Proceed with caution,” The Denver Post 176: “We hope that the executive
branch and Congress will be especially vigilant to make sure that, in the rush
to defeat terrorism, they don't turn a free country into a virtual prison.”
Feedback from special interest groups, e.g. ACLU or CDC, came with
many, blow by blow analysis of anti-terrorism legislations when the
legislation moved through the Congress. But none of these NGOs were
invited to submit their comments, officially. There is no telling if any of
them received the attention or consideration of the administration, if at all.177
The pressure to act expeditiously came from the administration as well as
Congressional members.178 The Attorney General threatened the Congress
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with dire circumstances if anti-terrorism measures were not passed, in a
timely manner (in days not weeks). Senator Hatch wanted the Senate to act
quickly:
“We should not let some of the petty aspects of this body stand
in the way, not passing this type of legislation right now when it
is really needed, on the day that, for the first time in my 25
years, a vote was interrupted by a bomb threat and we all had to
move outside.…It is time to start fixing these laws. We can play
around with commissions. We can play around with task forces.
We can do a lot of other things, but I would like to fix it now.”
179

IV
A Preliminary Assessment
The biggest concern with the USA PATRIOT ACT, from friends and
foes alike, was that the Administration's original bill (MATA) was not
developed in response to the events of 9/11. Many of the measures have
nothing to do with ratifying pre 9/11 intelligence failure of improving our
post 9/11 counter-terrorism efforts. For example, most of the
Administration's anti-terrorism measures could be equally applied
domestically for criminal investigation, e.g. use of FSIA warrant to
investigate organized crime. The Administration bitterly resisted any
attempt to restrict and limit the application of anti-terrorism provisions to
specific situations, preferring instead to ask for broad and sometimes
unlimited powers.
More damningly, the Administration resisted every reasonable effort to find
an accommodation between Administration’s perceived security needs and
the nation’s real civil liberty concerns. The Administration was not in the
mood of negotiation, many of the important and reasonable proposals were
rejected, without examination and discussion. For example, the Congress
was prepared to provide interim emergency authority for the Administration
vnweb.hwwilsonweb.com.www.remote.uwosh.edu:2048/hww/shared/shared_main.jhtml;
jsessionid=MDAM1BYYF54GPQA3DIMCFFWADUNBIIV0?_requestid=78525
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COMMERCE, JUSTICE, AND STATE, THE JUDICIARY, AND RELATED
AGENCIES APPROPRIATIONS ACT, 2002--Continued -- (Senate - September 13,
2001). http://www.cdt.org/security/010913senatewiretap.shtml
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pending more in-depth study of counter-terrorism and Homeland Security
needs. This was declined by the Administration, e.g. in case of grand jury
information sharing judges could be asked to order such disclosure to save
lives.180
The ACT consisted of provisions that had long rested in the files of the lawenforcement and intelligence agencies waiting for the right moment.181 But
even Attorney General John Ashcroft, who as a senator had expressed great
skepticism about many of these items, now insisted that Congress act within
a week.182
The ACT was not formally submitted by the Administration, since that
would have required a review process coordinated by the Office of
Management and Budget--a procedure that would have provided an
opportunity for all concerned agencies to provide comments.183
The USA PATRIOT ACT passed the Congress with an overwhelming
major, i.e. 356-66 in the House and 98-1 in the Senate and in record time
180
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(six weeks – 9/19 to 10/26/2001), with the nation laboring in a war time
environment and Congress operating with a siege mentality.
As to the process, there were no time for public consultation,184 community
feedbacks, professional input, and Congressional scrutiny.185 Not only were
there no consultation, the public has a difficulty in obtaining the necessary
information to formulate an informed judgment on the issues involved.
The position taken up by Feingold best summed the concerns raised by
issues presented by the whole USA PATRIOT ACT process from beginning
to end. Senator Russ Feingold, chairman of the Constitution Subcommittee
of the Judiciary Committee, was consistent in expressing his reservations
about the USA PATRIOT Act (H.R. 3162), in content and process, in his
statement on the Senate Floor on October 25, 2001 in casting his lone
dissenting vote.
The Senator called upon the National, Congress and public to “continue to
respect our Constitution and protect our civil liberties in the wake of the
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attacks” and cautioned against “the mistreatment of Arab Americans,
Muslim Americans, South Asians, or others in this country.”186
Senate Feingold reminded the Nation that “wartime has sometimes brought
us the greatest tests of our Bill of Rights”, giving such examples as the
passage of “Alien and Sedition Acts [of 1798], the suspension of habeas
corpus during the Civil War, the internment of Japanese-Americans,
German-Americans, and Italian-Americans during World War II, the
blacklisting of supposed communist sympathizers during the McCarthy era,
and the surveillance and harassment of antiwar protesters, including Dr.
Martin Luther King Jr., during the Vietnam War.”
The Senator objected to the USA PATRIOT Act on philosophical,
procedural and substantive grounds:
Philosophically, Feingold was against trading liberties for security:
“Of course, there is no doubt that if we lived in a police state, it
would be easier to catch terrorists. If we lived in a country that
allowed the police to search your home at any time for any
reason; if we lived in a country that allowed the government to
open your mail, eavesdrop on your phone conversations, or
intercept your email communications; if we lived in a country
that allowed the government to hold people in jail indefinitely
based on what they write or think, or based on mere suspicion
that they are up to no good, then the government would no
doubt discover and arrest more terrorists. But that probably
would not be a country in which we would want to live. And
that would not be a country for which we could, in good
conscience, ask our young people to fight and die. In short, that
would not be America. Preserving our freedom is one of the
main reasons that we are now engaged in this new war on
terrorism. We will lose that war without firing a shot if we
sacrifice the liberties of the American people.”187
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Procedurally, he was against to rushing the USA PATRIOT Act through
Congress:
“ You may remember that the Attorney General …provided the
text of the bill the following Wednesday, and urged Congress to
enact it by the end of the week….the pressure to move on this
bill quickly, without deliberation and debate, has been
relentless ever since…It is one thing to shortcut the legislative
process in order to get federal financial aid to the cities hit by
terrorism…It is quite another to press for the enactment of
sweeping new powers for law enforcement that directly affect
the civil liberties of the American people without due
deliberation by the peoples' elected representatives.” 188
The AG was quick to rebut the charge and defend the process:
Well, frankly, I don't know that I—it might be better to allow
different Members to ask specific questions. I do want to
recognize the fact that over the course of the last maybe 10
days, I've been working with individuals from the Minority
Leader of the House to the Committee Chairman in the Senate.
We've had lots of time together. The Ranking Member and I
have spent time together. The Chairman and I have spent time
together. We've invited the leadership of Committees of both
Houses to confer with us about this measure, and we—we
believe that this is a measure that should—that is the result of
collaborative effort and work, and so there is reason for us to
have substantial agreements.189
Substantively, Feingold was of opinion that the USA PATRIOT ACT
(“bill”) failed to “strike the right balance between empowering law
enforcement and protecting civil liberties.”
Particularly, he has the following objections:190
188
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(1) The bill gives the law enforcement agencies new and expansive powers
to investigate not only terrorism but other crimes, e.g. the “sneak and peak”
warrant. Government can now avoid the stricture and protection of the
Fourth Amendment by claiming "reasonable cause to believe" that providing
notice to searched suspects “may" "seriously jeopardize an investigation."
(3) The bill allows law enforcement to monitor a computer with the
permission of its owner or operator, but without warrant or probable cause,
e.g. unauthorized use of company or library computers by employees or
patrons.
(4) The bill allows the use of Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA)
investigative powers, without meeting the rigorous probable cause standard
under the Fourth Amendment, if the government can show that intelligence
is a "significant purpose" of the investigation, even if criminal investigation
is the primary purpose.
(4) The bill allows the use of FISA to compel the production of records from
any business regarding any person, if that information is sought in
connection with an investigation of terrorism or espionage. This allows the
he government to go on a fishing expedition.
(5) The original ATA allows the Attorney General extraordinary powers to
detain immigrants indefinitely, including legal permanent residents on “mere
suspicion” that the person is engaged in terrorism. The bill requires the
Attorney General to charge the immigrant within seven days. It further
required Attorney General or its deputy to review the detention decision
every six months. Suspected or non-deportable aliens might still be detained
without trial or based on mere suspicion for an indefinite period of time.
(6) The bill allows the detention and deportation of people engaging in
innocent associational activity, i.e. guilt by association. For example
innocent people can be arrested, detained and deported for providing lawful
assistance to groups that are not even designated by the Secretary of State as
terrorist organizations, but instead have engaged in vaguely defined
"terrorist activity" sometime in the past. To avoid deportation, the immigrant
should be increased; statues of limitations for terrorist offenses should be extended or
eliminated.
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is required to prove a negative, i.e. that he or she did not know, and should
not have known, that the assistance would further terrorist activity.
(7) The broad definition of terrorism might include Operation Rescue,
Greenpeace, and even the Northern Alliance fighting the Taliban in northern
Afghanistan.
Feingold was also not pleased to the intense pressure asserted and high
handed tactics employed first by the Administration and later by his own
party to speed up the legislative process and otherwise forced him to consent
to the Act. In Feingold’s own word:
“When the original Ashcroft anti-terrorism bill came in, they
wanted us to pass it two days later. I thought this thing was
going to be greatly improved. They did get rid of a couple of
provisions, like looking into educational records. But there
were still twelve or thirteen very disturbing things, and I
thought, OK, we'll take care of this. But then something
happened in the Senate, and I think the Democratic leadership
was complicit in this. Suddenly, the bottom fell out. I was told
that a unanimous consent agreement was being offered with no
amendments and no debate. They asked me to give unanimous
consent. I refused. The Majority Leader came to the floor and
spoke very sternly to me, in front of his staff and my staff,
saying, you can't do this, the whole thing will fall apart. I said,
what do you mean it'll fall apart, they want to pass this, too. I
said, I refuse to consent. He was on the belligerent side for Tom
Daschle. And everybody said they were surprised at his
remarks. Reporters thought it was so unlike him. And it is
unlike him.
One of the interesting stories in this-and this is one that a lot of
progressives don't want to hear, but it's the truth-is that John
Ashcroft gave me a call and said, what are your concerns? And
I told him my concerns about the computer stuff and sneak and
peek searches. He said, you know, I think you might be right.
The White House overruled him, which is a fundamental point
here. Anyone who wants to focus their fire on Ashcroft is
missing the point. This is the Bush Administration. Ashcroft is
its instrument. What happened in the Senate was that even
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though the Attorney General was going to allow these changes
to make it moderately better, the Administration insisted, and
Daschle went along with pushing this through. I finally got to
offer the amendments late at night, and I got up there and I
made my arguments. And a lot of Senators came around to me,
who, of course, voted for the bill, and said, you know, I think
you're right. Then Daschle comes out and says, I want you to
vote against this amendment and all the other Feingold
amendments; don't even consider the merits. This was one of
the most fundamental pieces of legislation relating to the Bill of
Rights in the history of our country! It was a low point for me
in terms of being a Democrat and somebody who believes in
civil liberties.” 191
V
Conclusion
This article is part of a larger research project about the “making” of the
USA PATRIOT ACT: when, what, how and why the ACT came into
existence. This article – “Legislative Process and Dynamics” - is mainly
concerned with questions of when, what and how, leaving the issues of why
to a later article.192 In the process, we discovered that the legislative process
was hurried and flawed. The ACT was passed with little Congressional
scrutiny and still less public input. For example, the ACT became law
without the citizens being fully aware193 of its nature, purpose and impact.194
This caused grave consequences with our political system
191

Matthew Rothschild, “Russ Feingold interview,” The Progressive magazine, May
2002. http://www.thirdworldtraveler.com/Politicians/Russ_Feingold.html
192
See Author, “The Making of USA PATRIOT ACT: “Legislative Climate and Political
Forces.” (On file with author).
193
The USA PATRIOT ACT was not widely known, before, and in some quarters, long
after it became law. The National news agencies and wire syndicate that inform citizens,
define issues, provide perspective and establish frame of reference, did not see fit to
report upon the ACT. See “Analysis of the Nightly News Glossing Over Anti-Terrorism
Act” 8th Day Center for justice http://www.8thdaycenter.org/092801.html (Both ABC
and NBC did not give the USA PATRIOT ACT the coverage it was due. Only ABC has
a short segment on 9/25/01 warning that that proposed anti-terrorism law: “"give the
government more power to spy on Americans here at home, monitor internet use with
little oversight from a judge, lock up immigrants whom the government says might be a
threat to national security without presenting evidence.")
55

First to observe is that the ACT raised grave concerns and caused much
alarm with the general public and affected groups.195 For example,
notwithstanding the fact that Section 215 of the Patriot Act has rarely been
invoked, library patrons feared that their reading habits were constantly
being monitored.196 More tellingly, Senator Feinstein reported that her
office has received 21,434 anti-Patriot Act letters, but less than half cited
USA PATRIOT ACT provisions as a basis of complaint.197 The citizens
knew something was wrong with the government’s draconian anti-terrorism
measures by was not able to articulate the sources of problems.
The commentators198 and librarians199 likewise were at a loss as to the reach,
scope and applicability of the ACT. This caused much anxiety and
194

The public have a lot of misunderstanding about the USA PATRIOT ACT. “Don't
fault the misunderstood Patriot Act,” “Letter to Editor” Detroit Free Press, July 26, 2003
(Jeffrey G. Collins, U.S. Attorney Eastern District of Michigan, pointed out that the
public oftentimes misconstrued the ACT. For example, they wrongly assumed that the
investigative (surveillance) powers given to the government is a sharp departure from the
past. Or, they erroneously blamed the ACT for allowing the “holding prisoners as "enemy
combatants.") http://www.freep.com/voices/letters/ecoll26_20030726.htm
195
Judging by public surveys, the public was hardly concerned much less alarmed with
any loss of civil liberties, when the Act was passed. Majority of the citizen, until very
recently, think that it is right and proper to allow the government to have more power to
fight terrorism at the expensive of civil liberties. But “ignorance” and
“misunderstanding” do breed concerns and alarms, especially when the fear of terrorism
subside after 9/11.
196
Nat Hentoff, “Big John wants your reading list,” The Village Voice. Mar 5, 2002. Vol.
47 (9); p. 27 (1 page) (The public is not informed and aware of the extent of government
powers.)
197
Susan Schmidt, “Patriot Act Misunderstood, Senators Say Complaints About Civil
Liberties Go Beyond Legislation's Reach, Some Insist,” Washington Post Wednesday,
October 22, 2003; Page A04. (At a Senate Judiciary Cmte. oversight hearing (Oct. 21,
2003) Senators expressed concerns that the public has been misinformed about scope and
reach, implementation and utility of the Act.). Watch, Sen. Orrin Hatch (R-UT) chairs a
Senate Judiciary Cmte. hearing on the adequacy of federal laws for responding to and
preventing acts of terrorism at C-Span on Tuesday, Oct. 21, 2003)
198
One commentator defended Section 215 by noting: “The "secret court" is the Foreign
Intelligence Surveillance Court, which has existed for a quarter-century. To even get
within the ambit of the court, probable cause must be demonstrated that the surveillance
involves an agent of a foreign government or power.” Bob Rob, “Shrill critics stealing
Patriot Act debate,” (September 21, 2003).
(http://www.azcentral.com/news/opinions/columns/articles/0921robb21.html In fact, the
USA PATRIOT ACT amended the FSIA “probable cause” requirement. Under the ACT,
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constellation.200 For example, librarians were puzzled as to whether they
were allowed to consult lawyers before complying with a Section 215
order,201 or how best to reconcile librarians’ professional-ethical
responsibilities to protect privacy and their legal duties to release client
information under the ACT.202 More tellingly, a national survey conducted
in December 2001 – January 2002 showed that librarians’ awareness and
understanding of the USA PATRIOT ACT to be extremely low. Barely
50% (57.7%) have “read or heard” about the ACT immediately after it was
passed. Correct understanding of different issues about the ACT ranged
from a low of 20.8%(allow executive of warrant to be delayed for
consultation of lawyer) to a high of 47.6% (allow access to record without
warrant).203

a Section 215 order can be now be obtained by a certification to the court of relevancy of
information needed to an on going terrorist investigation, without the need of
demonstrating “probable cause” showing that the surveillance involves an agent of a
foreign government or power.
199
Estabrook, Leigh S. "Public Libraries' Response to the Events of September 11th, A
National Survey Conducted by the Library Research Center at the University of Illinois
Graduate School of Library and Information Science." January 22, 2003. Library
Research Center, Graduate School of Library and Information Science, University of
Illinois at Urbana Champaign. January 22, 2003
http://www.lis.uiuc.edu/gslis/research/national.pdf
200
Rene Sanchez, “Librarians Make Some Noise Over Patriot Act Concerns About
Privacy Prompt Some to Warn Patrons, Destroy Records of Book and Computer Use,”
Washington Post Thursday, April 10, 2003; Page A20
201
Is calling the lawyer for help, not a prohibited disclosure under the USA PATRIOT
ACT?
202
48 states have protective library confidentiality and privacy law. The provisions of
the law usually run counter to Section 215 of the Patriot Act. For example, Calif. Gov't.
Code §6254 and §6267 (2001). The library may not disclose these records except to a)
staff within the scope of administrative duties, b) with written consent from the patron, or
c) by order of the appropriate superior court.
203
Estabrook, Leigh S. "Public Libraries' Response to the Events of September 11th, A
National Survey Conducted by the Library Research Center at the University of Illinois
Graduate School of Library and Information Science." January 22, 2003. Library
Research Center, Graduate School of Library and Information Science, University of
Illinois at Urbana Champaign. January 22, 2003
http://www.lis.uiuc.edu/gslis/research/national.pdf
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The pubic were further confused and aggrieved when the government, in
order to “mollify” the public,204 mischaracterized the intent and purpose,205
reach and scope,206 and impact and effect of the ACT.
For example, U.S. Attorney for Alaska testified before a state Senate
Committee: “[T]here is concern that under the PATRIOT Act, federal agents
are now able to review library records and books checked out by U.S.
Citizens… If you read the Act, that’s absolutely not true… It can’t be for
U.S. citizens.” In fact, Section 215 of the USA Patriot makes clear that
“U.S. persons” – a term referring to citizens and some non-citizens alike -can have their record seized by the FBI with a FISA order.
Mark Corallo, Justice Department Spokesperson, spoke to the Bangor (ME)
Daily News: “ For the FBI to check on a citizen’s reading habits….it must
convince a judge “there is probable cause that the person you are seeking the
information for is a terrorist or a foreign spy.” In fact, Section 215 of the

204

“Interested Persons Memo on Congressional oversight of the USA PATRIOT Act and
Department of Justice anti-terrorism policies – DOJ’s dismissive response on civil
liberties,” ACLU Memo, dated June 4, 2003. (“DOJ has been deceptive in describing the
scope of the powers it has been granted, apparently to mollify widespread public
concern”) http://www.aclu.org/SafeandFree/SafeandFree.cfm?ID=12812&c=206
205
“RIGHTS AND THE NEW REALITY; Telemarketer Terrorists?” Los Angeles
Times California Metro; September 13, 2003. Part 2; Page 10 (476 words) (The USA
PATRIOT ACT was being used to investigate common criminals, e.g. telemarketers
accused of swindling elderly consumers, a lawyer accused of stashing stolen funds in a
Belize bank account and various drug dealers. This is contrary ultimate purpose of th
ACT original intent of the legislators, and avowed promise of the Department of Justice.)
206
Maine Civil Liberty Union Executive Director, Louise G. Roback, wrote a letter on
April 16, 2003 to Senator Olympia Snowe complaining of FBI spokesperson’s untruthful
characterization of the USA PATRIOT ACT when responding to a Bangor Daily News
article: “Calais library fights Patriot Act” (April 1, 2003) about Calais Free Library’s
opposition to the USA PATRIOT Act. Deputy Director Corallo’s misrepresentation was
reported in “Official counters Patriot Act critics.” On April 9, the Bangor Daily News
printed an editorial critiquing Justice Department misstatements. See “MCLU Demands
Truth From Justice Department,” MCLU (“We are concerned that Deputy Director
Corallo provided false information concerning the powers of the Justice Department
under the USA PATRIOT Act to the public.”)
http://www.mclu.org/calais_letter_041603.htm See also Net Hentoff, “Op-ed: The state
of our liberties,” Washington Post Aug. 25, 2003. (The government put a spin of USA
PATRIOT ACT.) http://www.washtimes.com/op-ed/20030824-110950-4866r.htm
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USA Patriot Act allows the government to obtain materials like library
records without probable cause.207
The government’s failure to provide for timely, responsive and accurate
information over its enforcement policy (e.g., under what circumstances
would Section 215 powers be invoked?208 ) and practices (e.g., how often
has Section 215 powers been invoked?209) generated wide spread anxiety
and generated fear,210 leading to personal resentment, individual protests and
collective movements across the United States.211 As a keen supporter of
207

See “Reports: Government Missteps After Sept. 11,” Summer 2003.ACLU of
Northern California. http://www.aclunc.org/aclunews/news0309/reports.html Both the
government and ACLU have accused each other of misleading the public. For ACLU’s
allegations, see Seeking Truth From Justice: PATRIOT Propaganda - The Justice
Department's Campaign to Mislead The Public About the USA PATRIOT Act (ACLU,
July 2003) (“The Justice Department’s repeated assertion that the USA PATRIOT Act’s
surveillance provisions cannot be used against U.S. citizens. In fact, the surveillance
provisions are applicable to citizens and non-citizens alike.”)
http://www.aclu.org/Files/OpenFile.cfm?id=13098 The DOJ’s answer to “Seeking Truth
From Justice” is the DOJ’s “Dispelling the Myths” on Life and Liberty web. (“Myth:
The ACLU claims that the Patriot Act “expands terrorism laws to include ‘domestic
terrorism’ which could subject political organizations to surveillance, wiretapping,
harassment, and criminal action for political advocacy.”…Reality: The Patriot Act limits
domestic terrorism to conduct that breaks criminal laws, endangering human life.
“Peaceful groups that dissent from government policy” without breaking laws cannot be
targeted.” (Emphasis in the original) http://www.lifeandliberty.gov/subs/u_myths.htm
208
Eric Lichtblau, “Patriot Act's reach has gone beyond terrorism,” Seattle Times
September 28, 2003 (Government is using the USA PATRIOT ACT to investigate all
kinds of crimes: suspected drug traffickers, white-collar criminals, blackmailers, child
pornographers, money launderers, spies and corrupt foreign leaders.)
209
The DOJ chose to answer only 28 of the 50 questions posed by the House Judiciary
Committee by letter of July 13, 2002. See letters to Congress on implementation of the
USA PATRIOT Act, dated July 26, August 26, and September 20, 2002.
http://www.fas.org/irp/news/2002/10/doj101702.html
210
Eric Lichtblau (NYT), “Demand for library records? Zero,” Deseret Morning News
(Salt Lake City) Pg. A02, September 19, 2003, Friday (872 words) (Emily Sheketoff,
executive director of the Washington office of the American Library Association
observed: "If the Justice Department had been more forthcoming with the public … this
high level of suspicion wouldn't have developed. But they've been fighting for two years
not to tell people what they were doing, and that left a lot of people wondering what they
had to hide."
211
Emily Sheketoff, executive director of the Washington office of the American Library
Association aptly observed: "If the Justice Department had been more forthcoming with
the public, this high level of suspicion wouldn't have developed. But they've been
fighting for two years not to tell people what they were doing, and that left a lot of people
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Bush administration, Representative Bob Barr, has occasion to observe:
“The administration has not been at all forthcoming since then in explaining
in a clear and open way how that act would be used and is being used. The
lack of being forthcoming about discussing that has bothered me."212
Finally, the Attorney General Ashcroft’s farcical justification213 and inept
defense of Act214 infuriated the Act’s die hard opponents and alienated the
administration’s core supporters.215 For example, Attorney General Ashcroft
was openly contemptuous of the law makers’ rightful criticism of Bush
administration’s anti-terrorism initiatives: "To those who scare peace-loving
people with phantoms of lost liberty, my message is this: Your tactics only
aid terrorists, for they erode our national unity and diminish our resolve
They give ammunition to America's enemies and pause to America's

wondering what they had to hide." Eric Lichtblau, “Patriot Act debate needless, Ashcroft
says,” New York Times September 18, 2003.
http://www.chron.com/cs/CDA/ssistory.mpl/nation/2108405
212
Michael Tomasky, “Strange Bedfellows: Conservative civil libertarians join the
fight,” The American Prospect Vo. 14, no. 8, September 1, 2003.
http://www.prospect.org/print/V14/8/tomasky-m.html
213
“Civil libertarians criticize FBI rules; They fear the terrorism crisis is being used as a
cover to erode personal freedoms,” The Associated Press. The Grand Rapids Press May
31, 2002. p. A.3. (James X. Dempsey, deputy director of the Center for Democracy and
Technology observed: “They are using the terrorism crisis as a cover for a wide range of
changes, some of which have nothing to do with terrorism." Dempsey predicted that the
power will be used for "every other type of investigation the FBI does.")
214
”ASHCROFT'S ENDLESS ATTACKS DIMINISH OFFICE,” Dayton Daily News
(Ohio), August 11, 2003, Monday, CITY EDITION, EDITORIAL; Pg. A6 (540 words)
(The Attorney General was best remembered for his fear-mongering and vindictive
antics: “To those who are alarmed, or who question or criticize his approach, Mr.
Ashcroft has said: "Your tactics only aid terrorists, for they erode our national unity and
diminish our resolve. They give ammunition to America's enemies and pause to
America's friends.")
215
Myriam Marquez, “BLAME GAME: THE 9-11 BUCK SHOULD STOP WITH
ASHCROFT,” Sentinel Columnist. Orlando Sentinel. Jun 4, 2002. p. A.9 (“To Ashcroft,
it seems, the answer to fighting terrorism is cracking down on Americans' civil liberties
and immigrants' basic human rights.”) More recently, the Attorney General described
librarian’s concerns with the Patriot Act “breathless reports and baseless hysteria.” See
Prepared Remarks of Attorney General John Ashcroft "The Proven Tactics in the Fight
against Crime" Washington, D.C., September 15, 2003. See also ERIC LICHTBLAU,
“Ashcroft Mocks Librarians and Others Who Oppose Parts of Counterterrorism Law,”
New York Times, September 16, 2003.
http://www.nytimes.com/2003/09/16/politics/16LIBR.html
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friends." 216 He was publicly dismissive of librarians’ legitimate concern
with the erosive impact of Patriot Act on library privacy: “The charges of the
hysterics are revealed for what they are: castles in the air built on
misrepresentation, supported by unfounded fear, held aloft by hysteria." 217
Last not least, Barbara Comstock, a spoke person the Department of Justice,
was loudly belittling local grassroots communities’ genuine anti-Patriot
sentiments:
“Some of the different ordinances that have passed throughout
the country, about 45 percent of them, almost half, are either in
cities in Vermont, very small populations, or in sort of college
towns in California. It’s in a lot of the usual enclaves where you
might see nuclear-free zones or, you know, they probably
passed resolutions against the war in Iraq.”
The statement drew predictable and angry response from Senator Leahy:
“It is unfortunate that the Justice Department felt it appropriate
to ridicule these grass-roots efforts to participate in an
important national dialogue. The opportunity to engage in
public discourse is one of the essential rights of Americans, and
I am proud that Vermont towns are among those dedicated to
thinking about and acting on these important issues. More
importantly, the concerns expressed in my home state are being
echoed by Americans in all 50 states. These communities
represent millions upon millions of Americans, not just a few
liberty-and-privacy-conscious Vermonters, as the Justice
Department has insinuated. Impugning Vermonters, dedicated
librarians and United States Senators for asking questions and
raising concerns does not advance the debate or instill public
confidence in the Ashcroft Justice Department’s use of the vast
powers it wields. In fact, it achieves the opposite.” 218
216

See Testimony of Attorney General John Ashcroft Senate Committee on the Judiciary
December 6, 2001.
http://www.usdoj.gov/ag/testimony/2001/1206transcriptsenatejudiciarycommittee.htm
217
Ashcroft later explained to ALA that he was not directing his comments to the
librarians, but the ACLU.
218
Statement of Senator Patrick Leahy, Ranking Member, “Senate Committee on the
Judiciary Hearing on Protecting Our National Security from Terrorist Attacks: A Review
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As a result of above observed public confusion and anxiety, government
zealotry and ineptitude, the USA PATRIOT ACT continues to draw
vociferous criticism219 and fiery protests, 220 four years after its passage.221
Many of the issues that should and could have been carefully investigated
and seriously discussed,222 such as the impact and implications of the USA
of Criminal Terrorism Investigations and Prosecutions.” October 21, 2003.
http://www.senate.gov/~judiciary/member_statement.cfm?id=965&wit_id=2629
219
By far the most vocal and prolific commentator is Nat Hentoff, a columnist with the
Village voice. For his brief Bio. See “Nat Hentoff” Washington Post. (1998)
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/politics/opinions/hentoff.htm For a sample of his
critique of the Patriot Act, see “Ashcroft Out of Control: Ominous Sequel to USA Patriot
Act,” Village Voice February 28th, 2003 and “Crossing Swords With General Ashcroft:
Where Is Our Bill of Rights Defense Committee?” truthout December, 20., 2002 (Citing
Thomas Jefferson: “The spirit of resistance to government is so valuable on certain
occasions, that I wish it to be always kept alive.” (letter to Abigail Adams, February 22,
1787), he called for active grassroots resistance to the USA PATRIOT ACT.) There are
to be many others across the United States and from the very beginning. See “Opinion:
The Patriot Act is a threat,” Deseret Morning News (Salt Lake City), OPINION; Pg.
A15, August 27, 2003, Wednesday (479 words) (USA PATRIOT ACT was compared
with "general search warrants" used by British customs agents during American
Revolution.)
220
The Attorney General’s 16 states and 18 cities road show to promote the USA
PATRIOT ACT was met with protesters everywhere the Attorney General went. Diane
Urbani, “Patriot Act undercuts King's dream, Utahn says,” Deseret Morning News (Salt
Lake City, August 29, 2003. Friday (762 words) (The Attorney General was met with
200 protesters.) [Another account put it at 150. See Angie Welling and Jennifer Dobner,
“Act called vital tool in war on terror.” Deseret Morning News (Salt Lake City), WIRE;
Pg. A01, August 26, 2003,Tuesday (1008 words)].
221
See Leonard Kniffel, “CPL head's comments provoke outrage,” American Libraries.
Jan 2002. Vol. 33, Iss. 1; p. 30 (Librarian should never surrender library information
except by court order and with judicial process.) “EDITORIAL: Tempest in a teapot,”
Las Vegas Review - Journal. Jun 3, 2002. p. 6.B (It is necessary to trade liberty for
security in time of crisis.)
222
See GREG BLUESTEIN, “University professors: Country must not overreact,”
redandblack.com (University of Georgia student newspaper) September 12, 2001.
(Notwithstanding the catastrophic nature and tragic consequences of 9/11 attack, the
nation should not overact.). CATO analyst Timothy Lynch echoed many other others
that we should not react to 9/11 in a knee jerk fashion. Looking back in history, Lynch
observed that all of the country’s effort to fight terrorism was reactionary in nature and
laboring under a crisis mentality. “Government officials typically respond to terrorist
attacks by proposing and enacting "antiterrorism" legislation.” The Feb. 26, 1993
bombing of the World Trade Center gave us the Terrorism prevention and Protection Act
of 1993. The April 19, 1995 bombing of the Murrah Federal Building Bombing
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PATRIOT ACT on civil liberties, are now only beginning to be seriously
addressed by the lawmakers,223 critically debated by the public, 224 and
systematically analyzed by the Courts.225
The voices of dissents could be heard from interested citizens and concerned
activists across the Nation, from California to New Work, Wisconsin to

Oklahoma led to the passage of Comprehensive Terrorism Prevention Act of 1995.
Lynch argued that “The cycle: Terrorist Attack and “Anti-Terrorism Legislation” must be
stopped. Particularly, policy makers should refrain from legislation until they have time
to study and deliberate upon four issues: (1) accountability; (2) history; (3) reality; (4)
freedom. Timothy Lynch, “Breaking the Vicious Cycle: Preserving Our Liberties While
Fighting Terrorism,” Cato Policy Analysis No. 443, June 26, 2002.
http://www.cato.org/pubs/pas/pa443.pdf
223
See “Ron Paul Applauds Congressional Restrictions on Patriot Act,” The Office of
Rep. Ron Paul (R-TX), July 25, 2003. http://www.antiwar.com/paul/paul72.html
(Reprint)
224
See Editorial: “Privacy in time of crisis,” Orange County Register. Oct 1, 2001. p.
Edit; Chuck McGinness, “LIBRARIAN'S POST-ATTACK REPORT TO FBI SPARKS
PRIVACY DEBATE,” Palm Beach Post, Dec 1, 2001, p. 1.B; Anonymous, “FBI spies
on suspect at library,” American Libraries. Dec 2001. Vol. 32, Iss. 11; p. 24 (2 pages);
Pat Schneider, “NEW U.S. LAW AIDS SNOOPING ON READERS; LOCAL
BOOKSTORES, LIBRARIES WORRY,” Madison Capital Times. Dec 25, 2001. p. 1.A;
Nat Hentoff, “Big Brother in the library; Patriot Act turns librarians into FBI informants,”
THE WASHINGTON TIMES. Feb 25, 2002. p. A.21; Nat Hentoff, “Big John wants
your reading list,” The Village Voice. Mar 5, 2002. Vol. 47, Iss. 9; p. 27 (1 page
225
Carl Carlson, “Patriot Act Provision Challenged in Court,” e-Week July 30, 2003
http://www.eweek.com/article2/0,4149,1208043,00.asp For the text of complaint to the
first ever legal complaint filed to challenged Section 215 of the USA PATRIOT ACT,
see Muslim Community Ass'n of Ann Arbor, et al. v. Ashcroft No. 03-72913 (E.D.
Mich. July 30, 2003)., “Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief.” The complaint
alleged that Section 215 of the Patriot Act unconstitutional in violating First, Fourth,
Fifth Amendments of the U.S. Constitution (“Preliminary Statement,” para. 1, 2.)
http://news.findlaw.com/cnn/docs/aclu/mcaa2ash73003cmp.pdf
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Florida, on campaign trails226 and in public forums. The dissenters included
republican and democrats,227 civil libertarians and conservatives.228
Activists mobilized grassroots movements to establish “Civil Liberties Free
Zone”229 in open defiance of the Patriot Act.230 The Congress worked with
afflicted groups and aggrieved citizens to pass law to limit the actual harm
and contain the potential fallout of the Patriot Act, including denying money
for enforcement,231 requiring oversight into implementation, 232 and limiting
226

BILL ADAIR, “Graham quiet about his role on Patriot Act: On the campaign trail, he
isn't bringing up that he co-wrote the controversial bill in the Senate,” St. Petersburg
Times. June 14, 2003. (Senator Graham did not reveal his role in drafting part of the USA
PATRIOT ACT as former chairman of the Senate Intelligence Committee. Governor
Dean publicized the fact that he was opposed the Act as unconstitutional: “It can't be
constitutional to hold an American citizen without access to a lawyer… Secondly, it can't
be constitutional for the FBI to be able to go through your files at the library or the local
video store, to see what you've taken out in the last week, without a warrant."
http://www.sptimes.com/2003/06/14/Worldandnation/Graham_quiet_about_hi.shtml
227
On May 21, 2003, Alaska's Senate unanimously approved the country's second
statewide anti-Patriot resolution entitled: “HJR 22: PATRIOT ACT AND DEFENDING
CIVIL LIBERTIES” as a bipartisan effort. It passed the State Senate unanimously and
the House 32-1. http://www.akrepublicans.org/coghill/23/spst/cogh_hjr023.php
228
Nicholas Confessore, “In Bed with Bob Barr: How conservatives became the ACLU's
best friends,” American Prospect. Vol. 12 (19) Nov. 5, 2001
http://www.prospect.org/print/V12/19/confessore-n.html
229
As of September 18, 2005, 394 Resolutions Upholding Civil Liberties and Rights have
been passed in communities across the U.S. affecting 61,947,419 people: being
Community resolutions: 387 and State resolutions: 7. http://www.bordc.org/index.php
230
http://www.bordc.org/states.htm
231
Republican Congressperson Butch Otter from Idaho introduced an amendment to a
House Appropriations bill (HR 2799) to remove funding from the Department of Justice
to conduct "sneak and peek" searches. The vote for Otter's amendment was 309-118 with
widespread bi-partisan support. See also Congressman Bernie Sanders (I-VT)’s effort in
offering an amendment to the Commerce, Justice, State and Judiciary Appropriations Bill
of 2004 to cut off Justice Department funding for searches of bookstore and library
records under Section 215 of the USA Patriot Act. It is co-sponsored by John Conyers,
Jr. (D-MI) and C.L. "Butch" Otter (R-ID).
232
On February 25, 2003, Senators Leahy, Grassley and Specter introduced S. 436, the
"Domestic Surveillance Oversight Act of 2003." http://www.acluor.org/issues/terrorism/FISA_oversightbill.htm On June 11, 2003, Representative Hoeffel
and others introduced H.R. 2429, the “Surveillance Oversight and Disclosure Act of
2003. “ The bills amend the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 to improve the
administration and oversight of foreign intelligence surveillance.”
http://www.fas.org/irp/congress/2003_cr/hr2429.html
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the applicability of the Patriot Act.233 For example, on March 6, 2003, House
Representative Sanders (I-Vermont) introduced the “Freedom to Read
Protection Act of 2003” (HR 1157) in the House “To amend the Foreign
Intelligence Surveillance Act to exempt bookstores and libraries from orders
requiring the production of any tangible things for certain foreign
intelligence investigations, and for other purposes.”) HR1157 was
cosponsored by 129 bipartisan cosponsors. It was support by 20 newspapers
editorial boards, 40 library, book, publishing industry, and civil liberty
groups.
On May 23, 2003, Sen. Barbara Boxer (D-CA) introduced that “Library and
Bookseller Protection Act” (S. 1158) in the Senate “To exempt bookstores
and libraries from orders requiring the production of tangible things for
foreign intelligence investigations, and to exempt libraries from
counterintelligence access to certain records, ensuring that libraries and
bookstores are subjected to the regular system of court-ordered warrants.”234
On July 31, 2003 Senator Russell D. Feingold (D-WI) introduced “The
Library, Bookseller, and Personal Records Privacy Act” (S. 1507)
introduced on July 31, 2003 “To protect privacy by limiting the access of the
Government to library, bookseller, and other personal records for foreign
intelligence and counterintelligence purposes”235
July 31, 2003 Sen. Lisa Murkowski (R-AK) introduced “Protecting the
Rights of Individuals Act (S.1552) in the Senate “To amend title 18, United
States Code, and the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 to
strengthen protections of civil liberties in the exercise of the foreign
intelligence surveillance authorities under Federal law, and for other
purposes.”236
233

HR 1157 IH. 108th CONGRESS. 1st Session. HR 1157.
http://www.fas.org/irp/congress/2003_cr/hr1157.html See “The Sanders-Otter-Conyers
Amendment to the Commerce, Justice, State, and Judiciary Appropriations Bill of 2004”
http://listproc.ucdavis.edu/archives/ncal-lib/ncal-lib.log0307/att-0017/01
talking_points_on_the_Sanders-Otter-Conyers_C_J_S_amndt.doc
234
http://www.fas.org/irp/congress/2003_cr/s1158.html
235
http://www.theorator.com/bills108/s1507.html
236
Specifically the Act provides: "Sec. 4 would....return the standards for the FBI to get
orders from the FISA Court to the standards that applied pre-USA PATRIOT." "Sec. 4(b)
would clarify that a library shall not be treated as a wire or electronic communication
service provider for purposes of 18 U.S.C. 2709, so that a library cannot be required to
turn over Internet usage records (including e-mail) about its patrons." "Sec. 6(c) would
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impose a specific limitation on what aspects of electronic communications could be
captured with a pen/trap order" http://www.fas.org/irp/congress/2003_cr/s1552.html
For other legislative effort to scale back the scope and impact of the Patriot Act, see
“Proposed Legislation” Bill of Rights Defense Committee,
http://www.bordc.org/legislation.htm (Visited October 12, 2003)
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